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ABSTRACT
The roles of systems engineering, program and project management, and
engineering management are continuously blurred and challenged in complex
engineering organizations. The demands made of each of these functions can lead
to increasing role confusion in otherwise historically well-defined functions. It is
important to understand the reasons for existing practices in defining and utilizing
these roles and the functions they perform in today's engineering systems.
It is the goal of this thesis to show the motivation for current practices in systems
and program management, and to shed light on some of the lessons learned in
managing both the technology as well as the encompassing technology programs.
We look specifically at existing practices in the aerospace industry as our case-
study to understand matrix organizational structures, as well as gain insights from
the commercial industry and academic literature on the practices deployed in
innovation and new product development and management.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Matrix organizations are a norm in product development activities, especially in complex
engineering organizations such as those catering to the aerospace and defense industries. Over
the last three decades, there has been a conscious move from a pure functional paradigm of
product development towards matrix structures that utilize and bring together various functions
within an organization to a common, goal-oriented project structure. This structure is most
evident in the form of Integrated Product Teams (or IPTs) deployed in various organization
across almost the entire spectrum of commercial endeavor.
However, it is equally important to understand the motivation for the existence of
Integrated Product Teams both organizationally as well as mechanically in the way they bring
value to companies. The functions of systems engineering, program and project management,
and engineering management play a vital role in the overall product development envisioned in
IPT practices. It is also important to understand the boundaries of each of these functions and the
reasons for existing practices in defining and utilizing these roles systematically across
Integrated Product Team projects. At the organizational level, we look at some lessons learned
in determining the parameters used to find a best fit which aligns the goals of product and
organizational development with an organizational structure that brings value in attaining these
goals, including information sharing processes and practices, and the role of knowledge
management.
It is the goal of this thesis to show the motivation for current practices in systems and
program management, and to shed light on some of the lessons learned in managing both the
technology as well as the encompassing technology programs. To this end, we use the case-
study of an aerospace company's controls division which deploys such IPTs and gauge it against
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other IPT projects in comparable organizations. Additionally, we gain insights from the
commercial industry and academic literature on the practices deployed in innovation and new
product development and management.
We look at the historical motivations of the move from functional to pure matrix
organizations and the spectrum in between, in Chapter 2 and then look at the various strategies
for matrix and project-oriented organizations that utilize these structures in managing innovation
and new product development. We go on to look at the lessons learned in achieving an effective
balance between systems engineering and program management, as well as their scope and role,
in an aerospace contracting organization.
In Chapter 3 we look at the dominant team structures (functional, lightweight, heavyweight,
and tiger or autonomous teams) put forth by Wheelwright et al in their study of team structures
in organizations. We go on to look at a test model developed by Susman et al that tests the
variance and inter-relationships of factors such as group processes, project focus and risk
moderation. Finally, we take a deeper look at effective IPT processes deployed in the defense
and commercial industries. This chapter gives us a more holistic view of what constitutes a
realistic, effective, and valuable Integrated Product Team structure by contrasting it with other
variations in team structures.
Chapter 4 looks at the support infrastructure that can help organizations better manage and
nurture IPT development by looking at the role of knowledge management. To this end, we
study an argument against constant organizational changes that supports the view that processes
and support infrastructure itself can help organizations achieve the very goals where corporate
re-organizations have failed. In Chapter 5 we look into organizations that have effectively
implemented and managed IPT development. Specifically, we look at the aerospace industry in
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terms of two case studies, and then round off the discussion by looking at some lessons learned
in an (aerospace) organization. The gist of the principles and lessons learned from the Lean
Aerospace Initiative (at a high-level) with respect to systems architecture and product
development is also presented here.
Chapter 6 is our case-study of a large aerospace engines manufacturing company, where we
analyzed IPT development and structure with respect to their Controls Systems Division. We
use this study to analyze the material presented thus far in answering some of the concerns and
questions raised in our case analysis. Chapter 7 presents an overview of lessons learned and
points to areas that may be of interest for further research.
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Chapter 2: Organization and Strategy
A number of lessons learned in the process of matrix organizational development,
implementation, effective characteristics and case studies are presented here. This research has
focused on academic findings, industry findings, as well as industry practice (case studies) to
extract some of the most commonly and widely used lessons and practices. We start out looking
at the history or sequence of organizational changes that have mandated the need to move to the
matrix forms of organizations, and the value that such organizational structures provide to the
companies that deploy them.
2.1 Origins and historical assessment of IPT and matrix
organizations.
Over the last two decades, Integrated Product Teams or IPTs have been deployed frequently
in large complex engineering organizations. This is especially true of the aerospace industry
where the introduction of IPTs has been linked directly to regulatory requirements from
contractors and suppliers to the Department of Defense and other government customers.
As can be expected of any organizational implementation, the particular IPT structures
present at each company reflects to a large extent, theflavor of that organization's own
understanding and willingness to introduce this "organic and mechanistic"I process of product
development organization (with "organic " used to characterize the typical setup of organizations
in changing and emerging market industries, while "mechanistic" corresponds to the counterpart
organizational setup in stable markets industries).
Galbraith, J. R.: Designing Complex Organizations, 1971
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The two different styles of organizations for product development are functional
organizations and project organizations. The limits or shortfalls for these different styles is the
belief that if the "functional structure is adopted, projects fall behind; if project organization is
chosen, technologies are less well-developed" [1]. The advent of matrix organizations, of which
Integrated Product Teams are a flavor, attempts to address the pitfalls of the two styles (project
versus functional), and to bring together the best of breed from the two organization styles.
Additionally, there are degrees to which a matrix organization need be implemented, depending
on the environment, company-culture, and nuances of the industry among other constraints.
Functional organizations look to build around commonality, bringing together "activities
which bear on a common product, common customer, common geographic area, common
business function or common process" [1]. This commonality inherently leads to specialization
of resources within such functional groups, fed primarily by their ability to pool resources across
the encompassing organization (economics) and other factors such as allowing "career paths for
specialists" [1], which enhances hiring and retaining of career-minded technologists and
professionals. However, the functional organization because of its specialized structure is unable
to provide the bandwidth across the (encompassing) organization over time: "appropriate
quality.. .while fully utilizing all specialist resources.. .requires either fantastic amounts of
information.. .or long lead-times to completion"[l]. The technological emphasis in this case is to
the detriment of project demands.
In contrast, the project or product style of organization suffers from exactly the reverse set of
issues. While flexibility is the essence, project organizations require duplication of specialties at
times to provide for the simultaneous project support within the organization. Additionally, the
structure of project teams leaves little time for project participants to indulge in furthering their
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own technical and professional skill sets. The product or project emphasis is to the detriment of
technological or functional demands.
The matrix organization looks to implement an organizational structure that essentially lies
somewhere in the middle ground of the functional and product organizations - in reality a pure
matrix organization is exactly at the center of the spectrum between the two other forms (see
Figure 1 below). The matrix structure looks to provide the benefits of both "technical
performance and coordination", but as discussed below, the matrix organization itself has its own
set of shortcomings when compared with both functional and project forms.
Product Influence in Decision Making
R elative
influence
Functional Influence in Decision Making I
w 2 3
Functional Organization Matrix Organization Product Organization
A. K*Functional Authority Structure Dual 4  roduct Authority Structure
Authority
. V -Product Task Forces--- Functional Task Forces
Product Teams- Functional Teams
- Product Managers - 11 'Functional Managers*-
[4Product Departments Functional Departments
C. l4Functional Reporting -*-Dual Information and Reporting -Product Reporting*-1
System System System
Figure 1: The range of structural alternatives in choosing an organizational structure [1]
11
In "Matrix Organization Designs" [1], Jay Galbraith lays out the path of an organization that
moves from a pure/traditional structure to a pure matrix organization. It is useful to follow this
analysis (and analogy for departments looking for a justification of such a move) in
understanding the forces that compel matrix structures and the methodologies employed (as an
example).
General Manager
Engineering
Electrical Mechanical
Manufacturing
Fabrication Assembly
Marketing
Sales Promotion
Figure 2: A typical functional organization [1]
In a traditional functional organization, the verticals of knowledge lie in the engineering
(R&D, development), manufacturing and sales and marketing silos. To deal with the issue of
cross-department pollination and communication, companies use various strategies and processes
to enforce integration across the departments. Rules and Procedures are used "to achieve an
integrated pattern" [1] so that communication and cross-department interaction is mandated.
Similarly, planning processes used to control budget and costs are instantiated in order to spur
communication between specialized subunits. Hierarchical referral is the "standard
management-by-exception rule" [1] which is used for conflict resolution when sub-teams or
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projects are unable to reach consensus and the decision-making must be elevated (hierarchically)
upwards. In order to prevent the inundation of senior executive with such conflict resolution,
middle managers provide the direct contact in order to provide the decision-making required in
hierarchical referral. To facilitate the mass communication efforts between departments with
extensive interaction, the use of a liaison office or department is quite common. Such a
mechanism works perfectly for the organization if new products are introduced to market over
time (market reaction with ample lead time) and hence budget and schedule was easily achieved.
Such organizations operate even more smoothly if new product introduction is evolutionary
(versus revolutionary).
However, the limits of such functional organizations are tested when in fact a revolutionary
product enters the market (market reaction lead time is minimal). Issues in an appropriate
response to this event are inexperience with the innovation at hand, information and
communication handling (as informal and liaison contacts become inadequate), and the urgency
of rapid decision-making. These are all ramifications where coordination, communication, and
decision-making in creating a new product are unable to fit the schedule as the underlying
organization is orthogonal to such rapid response. Hence the need for a "decentralized
group...with representation from all departments...entering into joint decisions" is realized; the
concept and creation of a "new product task force" is the result [1].
Though these task forces are able to meet many of the demands as far as schedule and
expertise is concerned, the "amount of strategic decision making" that is necessary is
proportional to the "change in technology and markets" [1]. To address these and similar issues,
task forces give way to product teams which capture the distribution of representation of the
technology and manufacturing concerns but also limit the upstream escape of decision making
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by replacing (freeing up) top management with a structure of middle managers who make these
decisions. These product team structures bring permanence to the task forces and provide on "a
continual basis, [solutions to] recurring inter-functional problems".
But the product team is not without its pitfalls. Note that in this stage it is the technically
qualified personnel who dominate the decision making and influence (who is to doubt their
credibility and or question their opinion?). Hence important decisions are now made at the lower
levels of the organization, without adequate alignment with the global management perspective
of the company. In response, it is generally these technically qualified personnel who are
elevated to the status of a product manager in order to avoid this conundrum, and to bring the
"global, general manager perspective lower in the organization" [1]. What follows this new role
is the creation ofproduct management departments (the supporting infrastructure for product
management), though caution is exercised to ensure that the creation ofproduct divisions is
avoided. This is done to ensure that "specialization in the technical areas" as well as the
"economies of scale in production" (among others) are fully sustained and endured, while
simultaneously fulfilling the product manager needs. These product structures are now able to
provide the product-wise expertise and coordination.
However technical expertise is unduly constrained in this organization. Technical people are
increasingly involved in non-technical issues (less the product manager), wasting some of the
core expertise and talent they bring to the company. To alleviate this loss of technical
knowledge (recall that this expertise is mandatory and essential for the innovation portion of new
product information), the creation of perhaps a sub-product manager position is mandated. There
are two important reasons for creating the sub-product manager role. The first is that the advent
of this position on the product team frees up some of the technical expertise to return to the
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functional role. The second reason (all the more important) is that by choosing the sub-product
manager from the lower echelons of the functional organizations, not only does the product
alignment permeate the functional structures, it also allows for product-thinking to be engrained
in the entire organization. The technical experts are not entirely removed - they are called on as
needed by the sub-product manager when required. Organizationally, the sub-product manager
reports to both the functional manager as well as the product line manager.
General Manager
Product
Mngment Engineering Manufacturino arketing
Subproduct Subproduct Subproduct ubproduct Subproduct Subproduct
Vearta authority owt tht product (-M pirodxwl orpolion. thee Msa,60rAb ps amy 6C mrwd)
Figure 3: Structure of a Pure Matrix Organization [1]
The creation of the sub product-manager is the final step in moving the purefunctional
organization to a pure matrix organization. Overall, "these measures allow the organization to
achieve the high levels of sophistication necessary to innovate products and to simultaneously to
get these products to market quickly to maintain competitive positioning" [I].
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Impact of the degree of adoption of the matrix structure
The essential value of organizational design in going from a functional (or product/project
structure) to a (pure) matrix organization lies in determining the extent to which an organization
should adopt the matrix design. That is, in the figure above (Figure 1) where in the spectrum
should the new organizational structure find its place? To address this question we need to
understand the various driving forces which precipitate this change at all. To initiate this
analysis, note that so far the "design is specified by choice among the authority structure;
integrating mechanisms such as task forces, teams and so on; and by the formal information
system". These variables help in the "distribution of influence between the product and
functional considerations". Among others, inevitably the factors that influence choice are:
* Diversity of the product line and the rate of change of these products
As the number of products (lines) increases, there is necessarily a shift to move more
towards the product structure - driven by the need for and the increasing frequency of
"resource allocation, schedules, and priorities", coupled with decision-making on "trade-
offs between engineering, manufacturing, and marketing" [1]. Similar reasons compel a
move to product structures where a high rate of change of product lines is encountered.
" Interdependence of the various subunits
If there is a tight coupling of the various functional groups with the organization, then
there is a need to move more toward the product structure. For example, these
interdependencies can arise from "reliability requirements and other design
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specifications" [1] which force say manufacturing and design engineering to work closely
together.
" Level of technology, presence of economies of scale
A high level of technological change and innovation requirements and the presence of
economies of scale in an organization are both forces that influence the degree to which
an organization moves to the functional structure (Figure 1 above). As stated above,
technical expertise is developed best in functional organizations; similarly, "it is usually
more expensive to buy small facilities for product divisions that a few large ones for
functional organizations" [1].
* Organizational size
The size of an organization works as a moderating effect rather than directly influencing
the structure of the organization itself. For example, "the greater the size of the
organization, the smaller the costs of lost specialization, and lost economies of scale
when the product form is adopted" [1].
The analysis above provides us with a broad framework for conducting a qualitative
analysis of an existing organization and trying to determine where in the spectrum (Figure 1)
it should aim to proceed (structurally). Additionally, we have discerned some tools which
help us ask the right questions in the process: "To what degree are communications overload
occurring? Are top executives being drawn into day-to-day decisions to the detriment of
strategy development? How long does it take to get top level decisions made in order to
continue work on new products?" [1]. Answers to these questions provide us both with a
picture of where the organization stands today as well as which way we need to make a push
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to achieve the desired results (depending on current situation). Note that in determining this
choice on the structure spectrum, the differences are more when moving from the product to
the matrix form (which must be "triggered by monitoring the technological environments")
when compared with the move from the functional to the matrix form. Overall, modem
organizational managers must recognize the "different kinds of matrix designs and develop
some basis for choosing among them" [1].
The above analysis provided us with some influences that push an organization to IPT
structure, or matrix organization structure in general, and identified some parameters that a
company can use to rate the degree of matrix structure it should entail to suit it needs. We
now address one of these parameters, information processes, from an innovation and
knowledge management perspective in the next section. Here we identify strategies in
technology and organizational management used by some successful endeavors as well.
2.2 Management role in Innovation and Knowledge Management.
Corporate managers "must constant look backward, attending to the products and processes
of the past, while also gazing forward, preparing for the innovations that will define the future". 2
This is true especially of organizations engaged in complex engineering (including aerospace)
activities while competing with global corporations on the fronts of economies of scale as well as
highly technical innovation-based product creation. Each such organization aims to strike a
balance between the lean processes of creating today's technology with the high uncertainty
innovation challenge of aligning the company in pursuing tomorrow's products.
2 O'Reilly, Charles A., and Tushman, Michael L.: The Ambidextrous Organization, Harvard Business Review, April
2004.
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The challenge that exists speaks inherently to need for adaptation. O'Reilly and Tushman
point out that "Kodak and Boeing.. .are recent examples of once dominant companies that failed
to adapt to market changes". Here Kodak was unable to translate its success in analog
photography to the world of digital imaging. Similarly, "Boeing, a long time leader in
commercial aircrafts, has experienced difficulties in defense-contracting... having stumbled in
the face of competition from Airbus". [2]
Many arguments exist for why large organizations fail to meet the challenge of achieving this
balance. Arguments exist for this "conundrum", with the spectrum of explanations from "the
lack of flexibility to explore new territories" to the essential need for "cross-functional teams as
the key to creating breakthrough innovations" [2]. But there are organizations that are able to
cope with suchflexibility and meet the challenge of adapting successfully.
O'Reilly and Tushman assert that "in [their] study, 90% of the ambidextrous organizations
achieved their goals". [2] They define the ambidextrous organization as one that "manages
organizational separation through [the use ofl a tightly integrated senior team [but] exists as
structurally independent units, each having its own processes, structures and cultures" [2]. The
motivation for this organizational structure is a result of analyzing these successful ambidextrous
organizations. These organizations create a separation of strategy and process between the two
goals of creating and engaging "new, exploratory units" and the "traditional, exploitative units"
[2]. Such a structure allows for both strategies to be pursued in tandem.
For the four types of organizational structures analyzed (functional design, cross-functional
teams, unsupported teams, and ambidextrous, see Figure 4 below for characteristics of each
type) O'Reilly and Tushman found that "the organizational design and management practices
employed had a direct and significant impact on the performance of both the breakthrough
19
initiative and the traditional business" [2]. The reasons they [2] offer to explain this clear
superiority of the ambidextrous organization is that:
... the structure of ambidextrous organizations allows cross-fertilization among units
while preventing cross-contamination. The tight coordination at the managerial level
enables the fledgling units to share important resources from the traditional units... but
the organizational separation ensures that the new units' distinctive processes, structures
and cultures are not overwhelmed by the forces of 'business as usual'... [2]
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Functional designs
Integrate project teams into the existing
Organizational and management
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General Manager
Mfg Sales R&D
General Manager
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Cross-functional teams
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General Manager
Mfg Sales R&D
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Ambidextrous Organizations (below)
Establish project teams that are
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having its own processes, structures
and cultures, but are integrated into the
existing management hierarchy
General Manager
Emerging Business
Mfg Sales R&D] Mfg Sales R&D
Figure 4: Organizational design structures for new innovation projects [2]
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See figure below (Figure 5) for the framework established for creating an ambidextrous
organization.
n .- nr
common vision and values, and common senior-team rewards.
Figure 5: Scope of Ambidextrous organizations [21
One successful example cited is of an organization that looked to the advent of the Internet as
an innovation opportunity to expand and re-fuel its existing brick-and-mortar infrastructure and
business. To this end, the manager of the new endeavor decided to set up a skunk-works
operation, physically removing the new project to a "different floor", while envisioning "a
fundamentally different kind of organization" [2]. However, the creation of this organization
had the side-effect of fueling destructive competition amongst the new and existing employees
who saw "her unit as a competitor [and] had little incentive to help her succeed and made few
efforts to share their considerable resources with her" [2]. In a reversal of strategy in light of this
unforeseen behavior, the executive management of the company pushed for a strategy that
"required not greater separation but greater integration" [2].
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The resulting new unit was an ambidextrous organization that provided support both for the
brick-and-mortar operations as well as the innovation that the new online presence demanded. To
this end, an executive of the online unit who did not support the "network strategy" was let go,
and new demands from executives were made to the affect that "the senior leadership of
all.. .businesses be tightly integrated" [2]. The new senior management realized the need to
share the resources already available, and formulated a strategy that would bring the various staff
together and inline with this strategy; hence "they jointly decided" to bring all staff together by
training them on the skill sets required for the new online unit. After further layoffs and
departures of executives who were still not inline with the new strategy, the company changed
the incentives structure and payout design to match closer cooperation between all units, further
integrating the divisions, resulting in the creation of a "far more collaborative and faster paced"
[2] organization.
Another example cited is of a multinational corporation that was increasing under
competition and "ever-shrinking profit" streams from its existing line of products. The vice
president of the company, keenly aware of the underpinnings, realized the need for a strategy to
avert this threat by "simultaneously producing a stream of breakthroughs" to take on the
competition. To this end, the "entire R&D budget would... be dedicated to producing
breakthroughs" while the existing units were to pursue "incremental innovations. ... Autonomous
units for the new projects" were created "each with it's own R&D finance, and marketing
functions" with a leader for each project chosen for his/her "willingness to challenge the status
quo and...ability to operate independently" [2].
The new units so created worked independently: they performed their own hiring, developed
custom processes to fit the project, and established their own rewards system. However the need
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to integrate, vis-i-vis share the resources and expertise of the existing organizations was
imperative for sustenance. To facilitate this integration, the Vice President "had the leaders of
all the breakthrough projects report to a single executive" and "were asked to sit in on [the VP's]
executive team meetings" [2]. This action "underscored the connections between the
breakthrough initiatives and the conventional operation[s]", and coupled with a new incentive
system that "[rewarded] managers primarily for overall company performance", led to a well-
balanced organizational structure. Thus, "ambidexterity paid off' for the company on both
fronts, and goals were successfully achieved. [2].
O'Reilly and Tushman maintain that "the forces of inertia in companies are strong" and
recognize "how hard it is to break out of a rut, especially a comfortable, profitable rut" but set
out to show that "not only can an established company renew itself...it can do so without
destroying or hampering its traditional business":
"Given the executive will", combined with "the structure [and] the organizational separation
with senior team integration" can help any "company... become ambidextrous" [2]
We will visit the above analysis of the ambidextrous manager and organization in a team
structure setting; that setting is that of a tiger or anonymous team structure, put forth by
Wheelwright et al. For now, we delve into more detailed analysis of team membership, and look
at the alignment of systems engineering and program management functions in a defense
contracting organization and some of the techniques deployed in both differentiating as well as
integrating the two functions.
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2.3 Systems Engineering and Program Management: Case
Analysis
It is important to understand the interaction between the Systems Engineering and Program
Management functions of any engineering organization. A study by Bert Lilburn3 at LMIT
(Lockheed Martin Idaho Technologies) presents some roles and definitions that shed light on the
differences and the similarities of the two roles, especially in large (aerospace/defense)
engineering organizations.
At LMIT, the systems engineering discipline is defined as "a proven discipline that defines
and manages program requirements, controls risks, ensures program efficiency, supports
informed decision making, and verifies that products and services meet customer needs" [3]; this
process is shown diagrammatically below:
3 Lilburn Bert: Integrating Systems Engineering and Program Management: Proceedings from INCOSE 1996
symposium
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Figure 6: Systems engineering process at LMIT [31
Similarly, the process for program management at LMIT is depicted below: Note that program
management at LMIT is a "process of Integrated Functional Management".
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The key lessons with respect to this integration are listed below:
Systems Engineering
* Is a part of planning the customer's product as well as producing the customer's product!
* "Is a listening process (listening to the customer, understanding the customer wants, and
defining the customer wants), a creative process (what product best fits what the
customer wants), and a verification process (does the product produce what the customer
wants?)." [3]
* The "functional decomposition [of corresponding] functions" is:
27
PPogrnRcswe MsDioInrcte
Work Work
CEO ovelm .......
Board
assen Integrated
00ard uagm Anntual
ereup Work Plan
anno- 
cwas
sift opffw
Zn DdWA o
PrmwMagn
Contra AccowvtMwwwgers
WorA PabdwMawirs
Peqfonmen
Sysewm &gwkrn4
WetWW* .1
ad mase INELNce Pdut
Wmkftckaue
o Defining the work
o Defining and managing the definition of the product
o Determining the method to verify...the product meets ... requirements
o Verifying product performance [3]
This functional decomposition is the key to integrating the systems engineering and program
management disciplines. The "key insight [to this integration is to] ask the question 'what is
the lower level function(s) needed to perform the higher level function'?" [3]. In light of this
functional decomposition, certain functions emerge that are best fulfilled by systems
engineers while others correspond directly to program management skills. The functions that
are performed well by systems engineers include (extracted from [3]):
" Define the work to be performed for the customer
" Define and manage the definition of the product that best meets the customer's
requirements
* Determine the method to verify that the product meets the customer's requirements
" Validate and reach an agreement on the requirements with the customer
* Verify product performance
" Determine technical deficiencies
* Review technical performance of the product
" Review work status and determine the cause of the technical deficiencies and the cost and
schedule variances
" Determine the impact of the technical deficiencies and the cost/schedule variances on the
entire set of system requirements over the life cycle of the system
" Determine a mitigation action.
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Similarly, functions that correspond well within the program management skill set include
(extracted from [3]):
* Determine the tasks to produce the product
* Determine the project management and project control tasks needed
* Plan the customer's product
* Present the plan to the customer and reach an agreement on the plan
* Manage the flow of the customer's work and the flow of the money
" Produce the customer's product (limited contributions: a performerfunction)
* Verify schedule performance
" Verify cost performance
* Determine cost and schedule variances
" Document product verification results
* Review work being performed against authorized work
" Review funding against total cost and outstanding obligations
* Implement the mitigation action to manage the risk related to the work
* Report on the customers work and resolve issues with the customer
" Manage changes to the customers work
" Deliver the product and closeout the customers work
In performing these functions, training is highly recommended. For example, "a ten-week
course on systems engineering.. .that follows the process in Figure 6" is practiced at LMIT,
while project management is taught to all concerned employees [3]. The implicit integration of
the twofunctions occurs when the "conflict... on who claims responsibility for a spccific
function..." is replaced by organizing "around customer needs and wants and not organizational
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functions" [3]. Further, the "function... allocated to everyone" is that of developing "a team that
displays trust, respect, discipline and cohesion" [3].
Thus the roles of and definitions of systems engineering and program management are
allowed to evolve out of the necessary functions that need to be performed in fulfilling customer
requirements. That is, customer needs are ascertained, decomposed, and assigned not along
organizational functions but along individual core competencies, developed over time or through
training.
Chapter Summary
It is important to understand that the historical basis on which matrix organizational
structures have evolved, with the understanding that not all projects are best developed using
cross-functional structures. In this light, we have seen that in fact the cross-functional or IPT
structure is well suited where there is a need to develop new products based on (1) the need to
pool resources or talent across a variety of programs or (2) unexplored on cutting-edge
technologies, the likes of which an organization may not be familiar where a smaller, focused
effort is required. The ambidextrous organization or one which holds the ability of producing
both its stable line of products as well as introducing new products uses this cross-functional
concept in the latter case of development to both stave off competition as well as guard against
the danger of stagnation in product and technology.
Of the many ways in which the division of labor can be performed within an IPT, we see that
functional decomposition works well in organizations that look to the fulfillment of customer
needs as the highest priority. Not only does this service-centric methodology provide a business-
focused solution, it can also help in defining the various roles and functions (systems engineering
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versus program management) in pulling the product together and provide organizational
guidance. In the next chapter, we look at a variety of IPT structures, where and how they work
best, and some characteristics of the team and organizational process involved.
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Chapter 3: IPT processes and effectiveness
We now go on to look at the mechanisms and characteristics of effective IPTs. In studying
and discerning these, we look at the strengths and weakness of the four team structures put forth
by Wheelwright et al in analyzing project teams. We look at the results of a model tested by
Susman et al of some of some effective IPT behaviors and their inter-relationships with each
other. Finally, we complement our findings with a case study of findings with respect to the
Lean Aerospace Initiative.
3.1 Project Team structures: functional, lightweight, heavyweight,
and autonomous
The evolution of Integrated Product Teams has historically been motivated by various
combinations in project teams in product development. It is therefore important to understand
the motivation for a matrix organization setup (see chapter 2), as well as the choices available in
reaching the cross-functional matrix project organization that is Integrated Product Team
development.
In their book "Revolutionizing Product Development" 3 Wheelwright et al. studied project
organization and the associated project team structures found commonly in product development.
They found with large established companies, the primary organizational structures represented
functional specialization, be it in engineering, marketing or manufacturing. Here project-based
new product development was a strain on the given organization structure "rather than
representing their primary focus of attention" [13]. This structure was found to be further
13 Wheelwright, Steven C., Clark, Kim B.: Revolutionizing Product Development: Quantum Leaps in Speed,
Efficiency, and Quality: Macmillan, 1992
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specialized in that marketing focus was primarily product or segment based, engineering was
mostly technical functional based, and manufacturing was found to be "a mix between functional
and product market" [13]. The stable market organization finds itself increasingly inept at being
able to match the product development organization required for new product innovation and
development, most likely incurred in the face of competition by other firms.
Hence more and more companies looked to cross-functional teams as a way to generate a
responsive project organization for new development, while keeping to the old structures for the
stable markets and products. However, this introduction of cross-functional teams soon led to
the organizations' realization that managers were now being strained in their workloads as they
kept their traditional as well as these new team roles, "in sharp contrast to a handful of firms who
had discovered the "keys to success" in making teams work effectively" [13]. In their study,
Wheelwright et al proposed the existence of four basic types of team structures that existed,
either traditionally or as a response to project team organization in the face of competition for
new product development.
The four types of dominant team structures they found, each with its own set of project
leadership and organization nuances, strengths and weaknesses werefunctional team, lightweight
team, heavyweight team, and autonomous team structures.
Functional team structure is representative of the "traditional functional organization found
in larger more mature firms" [13]. This is the team structure we have already studied [Galbraith,
1], and is focused on the disciplines of the organizational subunits. Given these functional silos,
it is important to note that since the product development passes from one function to the next on
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a sequential basis (design, development, manufacturing for example), cross-functional
interaction is more an exception than a rule.
As is expected from functional specialization, strengths of such organization include
"managers who control the resources also control the performance of the project tasks"; hence
"the traditional wisdom of aligning responsibility and authority tends to be followed here" [13].
The disadvantage of such an approach is that not all development efforts can be cleanly
subdivided into functional group tasks that sit perfectly within any given organization nor are
"all required activities.. .known at the outset" [13], especially where the product being developed
is new technologically.
With functional organization, career paths are traditional and hence well laid out, which
normally corresponds to a well known, individualistic reward system that rewards based on an
employees performance. However, this can be a disadvantage when the project's success is
neither acknowledged nor rewarded (as opposed to the bonus and project/company success plan
proposed and studied by Oxman et al that will be outlined in Chapter 4). Hence project success
tends to have lesser priority on the performance criteria of the employees. Another advantage
listed is that in a functional team structure, "specialized expertise is brought to bear on the key
technical issues" [13] - this is just intrinsically functional behavior. The flip side of this is that
in such an organization, "the tendency will be design what they consider the 'best'
component.. .rather than [incorporate].. .overall systems characteristics or specific customer
requirements dictated by the market" [13].
Lightweight team structure The first degree of variation on the functional team structure is
the lightweight team structure. Here the teams still physically exist in a functional setting but
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"each functional organization designates a liaison person to 'represent' it on a project
coordination committee", who works with the "lightweight project manager" in charge of
"coordinating the activities of the different functions" on the project [13]. This position is a
deviation from that of the manager's role in the functional team in that it "tends to be a type of
overall coordination assignment" needed for the project [13].
The lightweight manager is generally a middle or junior level (who may have heavy
expertise) who does not carry much power or influence in his/her capacity. The motivation is
that the new role is meant to be a "broadening experience". Additionally, the lightweight
manager (project leader) lacks control over the resources required, which is still managed
directly by the respective functional manager. This can be an issue as consequently (due to a
lack of these powers), "lightweight project leaders find themselves tolerated at best" and
[organizational] expectations for improved efficiency, speed and quality.. .are seldom met" [13].
All said, in addition to the strengths of the functional team, the lightweight team structure
now provides for a person "who, over the course of the project, looks across the functions.. .to
make certain that individual tasks.. .get done in a timely manner... [and that] everyone is kept
aware of potential cross-functional issues". This provides for "improved communication and
coordination" as the organization "moves from a functional to a lightweight team structure" [13].
Heavvweight team structure Degrees stronger in management control of a project than the
lightweight structure, in the heavyweight team structure "the project manager has direct access to
and responsibility for the work of all those involved in the project" [13]. The project leaders so
chosen to run the heavyweight teams are normally senior managers within the organization
(unlike the junior and mid-level managers associated with the lightweight teams), and sometimes
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outrank the functional managers. Hence these managers do carry a lot of influence in their teams
(and organization) along with their expertise and experience. Another strength of leadership
available in the heavyweight structure is that managers "have primary influence over the people
working on the development effort... and direct their work directly through key functional people
on the core teams" [13] (Note that there is in fact a stronger and more coherent presence of a
core team structure in the heavyweight team structure). Yet, the performance evaluation of these
same personnel is still done primarily through the functional managers for whom they work.
An associated disadvantage of heavyweight team structures is that of the "challenge.. .to
achieve a balance between the needs of the individual project and the needs of the broader
organization" [13]. Additionally, because of the high degree of influence inherent in
heavyweight team managers, "heavyweight teams create potential conflict with the functional
organization" or worse, can create an organizational environment where "the rest of the
organization may see themselves as 'second-class"' [13]. There is also a possibility where the
heavyweight teams "become autonomous tiger teams (see below) and go off on a tangent" [13].
Autonomous team structure, or what are often called 'tiger-teams' are structured so that
"individuals from different functional areas are formally assigned, dedicated and co-located to
the project team" and "the project leader is a heavyweight in the organization and is given full
control over the resources contributed by the different functional groups" [13]. These tiger
teams are autonomous in the sense of the rules they follow as well - typically they "are not
required to follow existing organizational practices and procedures" and hence are free to create
an environment that works best for them.
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The primary strength of the tiger team is thefocus that it brings to the project at hand: "they
handle cross-functional integration in a particularly effective manner" and hence "tend to do well
at rapid, efficient new product and new process development" [13]. For these reasons, tiger
teams often become "the birthplace of new business units", springing partly from the autonomy
provided them from the initial stages.
Some of the weaknesses of the autonomous team structure include the consequence that in
generating a "new" approach, often teams will "expand the bounds of their project definition".
This may work against the desired outcome which may be to better utilize the existing
infrastructure or to redeploy existing technologies and products, as opposed to spring entirely
new components from scratch. Due to the higher than normal priority and status afforded to
these teams, "more than one team has 'gotten away' from senior management" due to a lack of
the high demand of management attention that the autonomous team structure intrinsically
entails.
Integrated Product Teams and Lightweight/Heavyweight Team structures
Depending on the level of integration, contemporary IPTs closely resemble the lightweight
and heavyweight team structures. While lightweight team structures remind us of the program
management paradigm of achieving project goals where a person look after cross-organizational
interaction, the Integrated Product Team is very much akin to the heavyweight team structures
described above. Note that in fact it is the work of Wheelwright et al that is regarded as the basis
of the modem day IPT structure.
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3.2 Test of a model of organizational contributors.
Two different factors of organizational contributors were analyzed by Susman et a 5 to
"address concerns of (a) the use of integrative mechanisms to counterbalance the potentially
negative effects of function-based differentiation via group process" (an alternative to moving
from functional by incorporating the group process portion of a matrix organization), and (b) of
"group process versus codification/computerization as alternative means to process information
as risk increases" [5]. In this analysis, we look to gain some insight on what particular aspects of
cross-functional interaction (of which group processes, computerization, and risk management
are all part) are correlated, and how does the correlation function with respect to these group
process design parameters.
The corresponding (the concerns above) two managerial challenges that product development
teams face are "the more ambitious a team's effort to incorporate downstream issues, e.g.
manufacturing, into the upstream or design phase of the product development process, the more
inclusive and diverse the team membership becomes", and "the challenge to facilitate
information-sharing and problem-solving among the interdependent team members" [5]. This
latter challenge stems from the fact that even though electronic and other similar communication
mechanisms do positively impact communications for a team with a commonframe of reference,
this is not so where differentiation is high and "team members are reciprocally interdependent".
To test these factors, Susman et al set out five different hypotheses to validate against the
model (see Figure 8 below for definitions and variables corresponding to "Project Focus",
"Group Processes", "Codification/Computerization", and "Integrative Mechanisms"). The
5 Susman, Gerald I., and Ray, Judith M.: Test of a model of organizational contributors to product development
team effectiveness; Journal of Engineering and Technology Management, Volume 16, 1999
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Hypotheses are presented in Appendix B. Hypothesis Statement and Regression results for
Susman Analysis.
The results of the model tested are listed in Appendix B: Hypothesis Statement and
Regression resultsfor Susman Analysis. Each of the hypotheses is validated against the data
which sampled 55 product teams, with an average team size of nine (see [5] for a complete
description of the research design and methods used in gathering data, as well as the
guidelines/regression techniques used).
The five hypotheses tested were:
HI: Project focus is related positively to project outcomes. In particular, team leader strength,
project-based rewards, and co-location are related positively to project outcomes.
H2: Group process partially mediates the relationship between project outcomes and team
leader strength, project-based rewards, and co-location.
H3: Codification is related positively to project outcomes.
H4: Risk positively moderates the mediational effect of group processes on the relationship
between project focus and project outcomes.
H5: Risk negatively moderates the relationship between codification/computerization and
project outcomes.
Susman et al found that with respect to H], team decision making and project-based
rewards were in fact directly related to "Project Outcomes". Conversely team leader strength
and co-location did not seem to be significantly related (either directly or indirectly) to "Project
Outcomes". Hence the validity for the correlation of "Project Focus" to "Project Outcomes" was
found to hold true only for team decision making and project-based rewards.
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Figure 8 : Susman and Ray model of organizational contributors [5]
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With respect to H2, "group process...did not appear to mediate relationships between
project focus and project outcomes", but that may have been due to the limits of the study itself
("this study focused on attitudinal dimensions and a study with focus on behavioral dimensions
may provide more complete and pertinent results). Thus H2 cannot (and did not) be assumed to
hold true. With respect to H3, codification/computerization were "not significantly related to
project outcomes", thus failing the hypothesis. However, "codification and computerization of
design guidelines may be expected to have a stronger impact on the success of cross-functional
teams than does codification/computerization of manufacturing data" [5].
Studying the impact of Risk as a moderator, H4 was also found to not hold true: "risk did
not positively moderate the mediational role of group process in the relationship between
project-focus and project outcomes". This was a direct result of the vanishing effect of group
process as higher level regressions were performed when additional variables ofprojectfocus
(team leader strength, project-based rewards, and co-location respectively) are added. H5 was
found to hold true as predicted. Hence "risk negatively moderates the relationship between
codification/computerization and project outcomes", and hence "product development teams
need to be cautious about the extent to which manufacturing data can be codified and
computerized in high risk projects" [5].
There were some basic assumptions in the underlying analysis. For example, the study
assumed that uncertainty would rise proportionally as new products and processes were added,
especially when the products were innovation-based or new to the company. In summary, the
study supports the hypothesis that:
0 Project focus positively affects project outcomes
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* The relationship between codification/computerization (of manufacturing data) is
negatively affected by risk.
Managers can use these results to "counter-balance the potentially negative affects of function-
based differentiation on product development projects", and gain "leverage by providing team
members with rewards that are based on project outcomes". Similarly, "team-member
involvement in decision-making can also lead to favorable project outcomes" [5].
3.3 Characteristics of Effective Integrated Product Teams
As part of the Lean Aerospace Initiative at MIT4. Here, it was determined that nearly 83% of
the aerospace/LAI Integrated Product Teams were developing "either new or incorporated new
technologies" [4]. In contrast, Pennsylvania State University (PSU) (consisting of projects from
the commercial as opposed to the aerospace industry) "was evenly balanced between high risk
and low risk project teams" [4]. Here the criteria used for making this determination between
high and low risk projects had been:
1) A product that was new to the world or company
2) Incorporated any new product technologies
3) Any new process technologies
Hence, if an affirmative answer was received for any two out of the three criteria above, the
project was label as "high" risk (or conversely, a project was low risk if it met one or none of the
criteria listed above). Hence projects that provided "enhancements to existing products",
4 LAI Organization and Human Resources (O&HR): Survey - Integrated Product Teams (IPTs) by Janice Klein and
Gerald I. Susman
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features to an existing product, cost reduction by value engineering, or if the range of products in
a line was broadened were all classified as low-risk projects.
One of the key findings denoted that in all such high-risk LAI projects, it was found that
"team leaders placed less weight on project costs relative to product performance and meeting
schedules", and "in early stages of the product development, 'product performance' is typically
interpreted to include meeting quality specifications" [4]. Some findings on the priority of
various IPT lead and project functions are provided for both low risk as well as high risk projects
in Figure 9 below.
With respect to program management factors, research found that "heavy-weight team
leaders helped to bridge cultural barriers between functions and encourage team members to
work together" [4]. This is specially important given that simultaneous product and process
design to achieve cost, schedule and performance objectives requires intense interaction between
team members within an IPT but different technical languages, priorities, career paths, reward
expectations, and planning horizons can lead to a lack of understanding" [4]. This decision-
making occurs naturally in an IPT due to the inherent structure that supports and skews decision-
making at the team and team leader (IPT leader) levels.
High Risk - LAI Hig~h Risk -- PSU Low Risk - PSU
Performance Performance Unit cost
Schedule Quality Quality
Development Cost Schedule Schedule
Unit Cost Unit cost Performance
Quality (product/process) Development cost Development cost
Lifecycle cost
Figure 9 : Rank Order of Distribution of Points given to Project Goals 141
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Similarly, with respect to organization structures and the influence of team versus
functional influence, Figure 10 below provides a spectrum analysis of IPT versus Functional
influence for both low-risk and high risk projects. Note that while a "50/50 balance may be
optimal for high-risk projects", "strong program management factors appear to be positively
related to the project outcome" [4].
Function
IPT Dominates
Dominates
50/50 Balance
IPTs A
Optimal Balance Optimal Balance
for low risk for high risk
projects projects
Figure 10 IPT versus functional influence [4]
With respect to group processes, "which refer to team based interactions and problem-
solving", and "include sharing decision-making with team members and facilitating agreement
among them" [4], a positive correlation was found between group process and their impact on
the overall IPT effectiveness. Inversely, it was also determined that the "ease with which teams
reached decisions was related to the IPT effectiveness" with "teams that found decisions easy to
reach were more effective that those that were frequently deadlocked" [4].
With respect to the overall effectiveness of Integrated Product Teams (IPTs), it was found
that:
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IPTs are "one of several important lean enterprise practices" that "need to be
supplemented with other important lean practices, such as organization-wide policies and
practices that support IPTs and by information-based technologies that allow quick access to
{manufacturing] data and design guidelines" [4]
Furthermore, most or many of the projects that the aerospace industry undertakes are
characterized as 'high risk' which pushes the frontiers of technologies, though as the product
lines stabilizes and there is a demand for more of the "derivative products", the number of low
risk projects proliferate.
Overall, the study found that managers need to strike a balance betweenfunctional and
product-based organizational structures. The degree and type of analysis required for such
discernment can be realized in the analysis provided above (see Origins and historical
assessment of IPT and matrix organizations.). Both Galbraith et al and Klein et al suggest that
there is a need for product managers and function-based managers to appreciate one and
another's input, a factor critical to project success. Sometimes this relationship can be ingrained
in the organization by "systematic rotation between the two types of positions...but it may not be
realistic to expect this kind of versatility... in managers". Other lessons brought forward point to
"a critical need to develop IPT evaluation systems, including explicit criteria on how team and
team member performance is assessed" [4]. We will analyze these and other criteria in the
analysis of knowledge and information management systems which facilitate Integrated Product
Team functioning in general, and innovation and high technology projects in general.
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Chapter Summary
Given the various types of team structures available in organization management of product
development, the IPT structure is a mix that sits somewhere between the functional style and the
autonomous or tiger team structure. Once chosen, the IPT organization needs to be wary of such
factors in management as group processes, team-decision making processes, the influence and
degree of information system use (codification), and risk and project outcome relationships.
High-risk projects are again defined as those that require a company to develop out-of-the-
ordinary (performance over cost), and it is in these projects that the IPT style projects fair better
when coupled with a more functional flavor.
Team membership and group processes turn out to be highly influential characteristics of IPT
development. It is not only necessary to understand the differences in the roles of functional and
product management in an organization, it is also imperative that the two work together
harmoniously in areas such as the process of decision-making to the establishing of appropriate
reward systems. Overall, we note that the positive results (hypotheses holding 'true') laid out in
the analysis hold true for both the Klein et al analysis of characteristics of effective IPTs, as well
as what Tushman et al point to as the necessary ingredients of an ambidextrous organization. In
the next chapter, we look at how some of these soft-skills can be developed along with a support
infrastructure for sustaining the effective characteristics of IPTs.
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Chapter 4: Support infrastructure
So far we have looked into the organizational structure history, process and information
influence, and common lessons learned. One aspect revealed has been the common need for the
organization to align itself with appropriate knowledge management as well as information
system and innovation management techniques and projects. The need underlies not only the
importance of creating new products, but also the capability of the organization to grow itself
into a more knowledgeable organization by avoiding redundancy in processes, information
acquisition etc.
In this chapter, we look at the issues driving knowledge management and other innovation
management techniques, and look at some lessons learned (as well as challenges faced) in this
arena of organizational development with respect to complex-product creating companies.
Finally we look at an argument that emphasizes the placement of productive process creation and
knowledge management in lieu of the constant struggle by corporations in creating
organizational structures to meet competitive challenges.
4.1 Knowledge Management hurdles and lessons learned:
Information Systems
We have already established that effective organizational structure needs to be balanced with
effective information-based systems that provide the corresponding support. Here we look at the
mechanisms and underlying principles that are encompassed in effective knowledge management
and information systems. The analysis and lessons-learned in this section are based on a study
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by the Center for Effective Organizations of 10 leading technology-intensive companies. The
study found that there were essentially four types of actions or "knowledge work behaviors.. .that
relate to the effectiveness in generating, sharing and applying knowledge and enhancing
performance in technical organizations (see Figure 11 below)" [6].
KimwIctge Work, MY__ _____nil
Knowledge Wrk -. -.. + Knowle-dge Outcomnes - +COMpaP eromacBhaviors
System Perfornunce
Generating Knowledg__e
-Sys ternallcPrcsePrfmac
Sharing K nowledgei d
and Processes
Trying New
Approaches
Figure 11: Mechanisms for deriving value in knowledge [6]
These four behaviors are the need for "focusing on systems behavior", "following systematic
work and decision processes", "sharing knowledge", and "trying out new approaches" [6].
* Focusing on Systems Behavior refers to need for employees to look at external factors
that "deliver value to stakeholders". These factors go beyond technical performance and
include "product cost, customer satisfaction, quality and contribution to strategy". This
behavior, "since it entails more fully attending to the contextual requirements... seems to
6 Finegold, David; Klein, Janice A.; & Mohrman, Susan A.: Designing the Knowledge Enterprise: Beyond Programs
and Tools; Volume 31, Organizational Dynamics, 2002.
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be a stimulus both to follow systematic work and decision processes and to share and
reuse knowledge".
* Following systematic work and decision processes "are a platform for the reuse of
knowledge and a springboard for the development of new knowledge...that facilitate
knowledge sharing". This behavior refers to the use of a knowledge system that is
comprised of "explicit" knowledge such as "standard work processes" which an
organization uses to avoid redundancy by helping its employees avoid "rediscovering
knowledge".
" Sharing knowledge is a fundamental goal of all knowledge management systems.
However, not all knowledge can be captured and "encoded in database", and it is this
"tacit and emergent knowledge [that] must be shared in person-to-person
interactions.. .within communities of practice, or through referrals, or lessons-learned
sessions
* Trying out new approaches is necessary since "best practices" developed in an
organization almost never apply uniformly across the entire organization. Hence, "in a
well functioning knowledge system", new knowledge is created by trying new things and
then sharing this new information across the organization so that "others may [replicate
and adapt] the experiment in other parts of the firm". Specifically with respect to "trying
new approaches", this technique is more likely to occur "if such experimentation is
explicitly recognized and rewarded and built into the work processes of the organization"
[6].
On these four behaviors, Finegold et al [6] find that these are "mutually
supportive... collectively underpin the generation of knowledge outcomes in new product
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development processes...and [result] in greater effectiveness in generating and incorporating
knowledge" in a company. Additionally, these processes and knowledge-system activities are
"strongly related to the ability...to continually increase overall company capability and...higher
levels of performance". It is also imperative that "the new approaches...are explicitly
recognized and rewarded and built into the work processes of the organization" [6].
Finegold et al go on to provide a "framework for designing the knowledge organization
along with a set of principles that can be used to increase the likelihood that these desired
behaviors will occur" (see
Figure 12 below) [6]. Using "Galbraith's star model organization design framework", the
alignment of five key elements of an organizations design: strategy, structure, processes,
rewards, and people are shown to "increase... focus on the activities required for effective
knowledge management" [6].
Strategy: The study found that "having a clearly articulated business strategy is positively
related to a company's level of knowledge management in the organization" [6]. This is so
because a clear business strategy helps to channel knowledge work endeavors towards the core
competencies of the company (as depicted by the strategy), and allows employees of the
company to channel their knowledge activities accordingly. For example, an aerospace firm is
cited for its effort in laying out a new strategy and bringing its employees on board by clearly
stating the goals and demands for the new business strategy. Using this approach, the company
was "able to signal to its employees what individual competencies they needed to develop.. .as
well giving them a heads up that their technical designs" needed to align with the new business
strategy. In this way, "a clear strategy is related to employee commitment, providing them with
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a sense that company has a future", and given this future, they too will be awarded "opportunities
for meaningful employment" [6].
51
Comunnicate a strategy that gives employees an
inderstanding of where the business is headed and
what competencies will he important in the future.
- Encourage intcrpersonal. networks for
learning and collaboration in dispersed
knowledge communities.
Articulate the knowledge strategy for the organization:
in what areas it intends to achieve competitive across boundar
advantage by being the knowledge leader. %crcss roi
.0 for ercatinm- ct
ILink project and unit goals explicitly to the capuning the c
knowledge strategies of the company. groaps.
Design a new employment relationship
to motivate employees to contribute to
cuganizational knowledge-
Support ongoing employee
development linked to the firm's
key knowledge needs.
Create explicit rewards for knowledge
contributions Treat I
Give employees a stake in the business. netwod
for the
Avoid over-emphasis on individual
pay-for-performance when rying to Namnes
foster knowledge-sharing in team-based knowle
organizations. andtoo
Work Magement
- Create roles and processes to capture knowledge
that is generated while doing the work.
" Incorporate more aspects of system peiformance
- cost of product, cost of ownership, quality,
serviceability, mannfacturability - into technical
work processes and tools.
- Build connecting knowledge into the standard
project management process.
rolEs to facilitate knowledge
ies and provide a catalyst
mmunities of praclice and
ollective wisdom of these
f as a facilitator of people
ks, rather than a replacement
n.
s IT to embed and capture
dge in core work pncesses
Is.
- Include knowledge objectives in the goals of the
company and its units.
- Regularly communicate team, business unit and
company goals and performance progress,
including customer and competitor infonnation,
so employees can think in terms of overall
business requirements.
Figure 12: A Framework for Organizational Knowledge Management [61
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Structure: Finegold et al iterate that "companies that create successful communities of
knowledge apply structural approaches that weave networks through the organization so that
people can be resources to each other" [6]. The motivation for this is multi-fold, especially for
organizations that engage in cross-functional organizations in product development. Given the
demands on the organization, "both seeking out knowledge and sharing knowledge are often
seen as time-consuming activities with uncertain payoff'. In the aerospace firm cited above,
working teams were pulled together from projects which had contributed to new product
development with the motivation that knowledge be shared and teams learn from one another.
However, structural approaches need a balance in that they need "support from
management.. .adequate resources [and] participation is an expected part of people's role" [6].
Processes: The study looked at three specific types of processes in the roles they play in the
design of an organizational knowledge management system: work processes, management
processes, and the use of information technology.
* Work Processes refers to the aligning and "combining of knowledge bases and the
sharing of knowledge into the standard work processes of the organizations". This is
important even in the most ordinary and automatic work tasks accomplished at a
company. Finegold et al cite an example of a semiconductor firm that decided to "build
such sharing into its project management process" [6]. The process involved information
gathering at the end of projects to build knowledge of lessons learned, technical
information gathering and archiving for future use, and incorporation of this into the
"divisions standard technical processes". Even though this was viewed initially as just an
added process, the company came to appreciate this "as a source of knowledge that
enhanced effectiveness... contributing to broader divisional performance" [6].
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" Management Processes: Goal setting, communication of company, business unit and
team performance information, and communication of customer and competitor
information...lead to... focus on system performance, rather than on the narrow technical
task" on part of the employees [6]. That is, sharing of overall business information is
seen to positively affect the systematic processes of an organization, and aligns these over
the long run. This is further enhanced if "explicit knowledge goals" can be enacted in an
organization.
* Use of Information Technology "The quality of information technology tools relates
to... following systematic processes and sharing knowledge" (see factors above) [6].
Though "knowledge management is not only about IT", IT is one of the major factors in
today's technology centric world for effective management of KM in organizations. IT
enables such strong organizational facets as virtual work, online sharing and aggregation
of knowledge communities, and cross-project communication in non-collocated
divisions. However, care must be taken to acknowledge the importance of IT only as a
vehicle on which knowledge management is delivered.
People: Finegold et al state that "the willingness to engage in these [KM] activities depends on
the psychological contract with the organization" [6] that exist with respect to the employees.
This is especially true in today's downsizing and highly globally competitive organizations
where the traditional employee loyalty may no longer hold true. Hence it has become increasing
difficult for organizations to "convince [employees] to contribute their knowledge and effort to
the wider success of the company" [6]. For such sharing to take place, employee "development
is crucial to the motivation and retention of key talent as well as.. .the ability of the organization
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to generate and derive value from knowledge" [6] (this is also "strongly related to all four of the
knowledge work behaviors" [described above]).
Rewards: Quite tacitly put, "companies that do not offer competitive reward packages are not
in the running for top talent" [6]. Beyond that however, there is a need to develop an appropriate
reward system that determines "how employees are paid". That is, "leaders need to design
reward systems that can achieve the twin objectives of attracting and retaining key technology
workers and encouraging them to share knowledge" [6]. To this end, the study found that "tying
rewards to the business performance of the team or organization-such as through bonuses and
stock options-relates to enhanced knowledge sharing", which is further accentuated if "the
majority of employees, not just top executives...share in the wealth" [6].
4.2 An argument against constant structural change
As a final topic in literature review, we study a contrary theory that warns against "constant
structural organization" and lays out the reasons for looking at process and other aspects
organizational factors that better add value to an organization.
Corporate re-structuring and consequential downsizing (rightsizing) and layoffs have been no
more prominent than in the last 10 years. As new paradigms of business conduct are constantly
explored, simultaneous organizational structural change invariably occurs. But new arguments
have now begun to surface that question the validity of this constant structural change, with some
who "disparage... the widespread malady of 'structuritis', whose principal symptom is the
"7propensity to issue a new organization chart as the first solution to any business problem" .
7 Oxman, Jeffrey A., and Smith, Brian D.: The Limits of Structural Change; MIT Sloan Management Review, Fall
2003
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While some organizations have gone from "functional to regional-profit center
organizations", others "have evolved into product organizations, as their products' more
favorable economics allow them to..." These moves have had a positive impact on
organizations, especially where "the employees' exposure to diverse area of the business" has
helped their own knowledge and skill-set as well as that of their organizations. But the fallout of
these re-structuring efforts has been a "demonstrable loss of loyalty... commitment, [and a]
rethinking [of] professional identities" on part of the affected employees. Management in
organizations is now "recognizing the inherent limitations of structural change... and choosing
instead to spark change with more long-term, potent catalysts" [7]
Many of the factors that the original "organizational chart" set out to achieve no longer hold
true (or can be deemed as valid). For example, the "cascading of communications" that the
organizational chart provided has now come face-to-face with technological counterparts:
namely "email, voice mail, instant messaging, and the Internet... which have disintermediated
communications, and.. .prevent the miscommunications associated with [hierarchical] handoff'.
Similarly, as "cross-department project work has become prevalent... performance-management
is increasing a matter of project-by-project evaluations...by project managers.. .who are not the
employees' bosses" [7]. The very premise of structural organization through hierarchy is now
jeopardized.
Oxman and Smith [7] go on to argue for the creation "more of a results orientation by
focusing on nonstructural issues such as people, processes, and rewards". "Managers could be
rotated" to this effect, "to diversify the experience and foster mutual appreciation and intra-
company efficiency". Empowerment of the workforce is necessary as we find ourselves
increasingly in "an era of employee ownership [where] the real value of companies lies less in
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their capital assets than in the heads of their employees" [7]; this is especially for high-
technology companies that rely on technological innovation and specific expertise in bringing
their products to market.
But as "confusion and cynicism " from 'structuritis' takes over, employees look to one
another for support in the hollow left by their employer's nonchalance. Oxman and Smith argue
that "middle managers and even executives are becoming ardent networkers, alumni group
participants, and professional group joiners" in an effort to locate a "non-threatening
environment.. .for communication, idea-sharing, and interaction", which leaves companies
(specially "as the economy improves) constrained by the needs of an increasingly mobile,
empowered, and educated workforce". But companies like BP are well-aware of the need for
"peer-awareness", where managers are being asked to manage both "vertically and horizontally
so that connectivity, experience and cross-unit assistance be asked for and provided". Other
companies "cross-align performance measures and targets in such a way that market heads have
product margin responsibility, and product heads are partially evaluated on market
performance". [7]
In light of these structural workforce dynamics, many companies are now turning their
management focus from "anatomical" to "physiological" ones - where anatomical refers to the
design of the organization structures (of which 'structuritis' is a ramification), while
physiological refers to the supplementary factors of "process, rewards, and people initiatives".
"Anti-culture cultivates responsibility" is the argument - none more apparent that at W.L. Gore.
Here, the company uses a lattice structure where the employees are responsible to one another
and to the project, not the typical supervisor or manager. The management argument here is that
leadership development is an organic process, where "leaders emerge naturally" and it is the
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management's responsibility to ensure that the proper reward system acknowledges performance
and leadership. [7]
In the final analysis, structural changes take a long time to implement and evolve to the
usefulness initially envisioned. Increasingly "physiology is trumping anatomy" as the demand
for dynamic and innovative response from organizations increases - this demand cannot be
fulfilled by implementing yet-another structural change. "Competitive advantage will depend not
on formal structural order, but on the agility of the organization.. .to use what they know to build
lasting value". [7]
Chapter Summary
For successful organizational development and improvement, factors such as knowledge
sharing, experimentation, and the leeway to conduct experimental projects are vital. We see that
a systems way of thinking (systematic processes, focus on systems behavior, etc.) invariably
adds to performance improvement at the organizational level. In a similar manner, other
components of an organization can be geared to enhance performance overall. Such components
include a company's process infrastructure (work, management, IT), its propensity for employee
development (people), a clear voicing of the company strategy, its reward system ties to
employee compensation, and sometimes the use of structural approaches in knowledge sharing
and assimilation.
The above infrastructure can be as important as the organizational structure itself. Some
corporations are moving to flat-structures in an effort to emphasize the importance of team
participation and the knowledge sharing that such participation intrinsically entails. In the
business environment today, a company's core-competency may vary well be the knowledge of
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its employees - hence it is all the more important to foster any process that can help capture this
knowledge, be it through cultivating people, processes or rewards.
In the next chapter, we look at case-studies in the deployment of IPTs from the aerospace
industry, which we later compare with our findings at the research company. We then go on to
look at literature on effective IPT implementation strategies and '10' lessons learned from this
experience. Finally we look at some general take-aways from insights gained in the Lean
Aerospace Initiative at MIT with respect to systems architecture and enterprise principles.
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Chapter 5: Analysis of case-studies and lessons learned.
From the previous chapters we have seen both the influence of important best-practices of
integrated product (development) teams, as well as the structure of the organizations with respect
to integrated product team development. In this section we start out by looking at 3 aerospace
programs that required extensive IPT deployment. Specifically, we focus on the Integrated
Product Team/Integrated Product Development (IPT/IPD) structure for the following aircrafts:
" The C-17 military transport airplane
* The F/A-18 E/F Fighter
" The F/22 Fighter
We then go on to look at the IPD process and IPT structures for the General Electric Aircraft
Engines approach to IPT and IPD Development in the case of the GE F1 10+ Turbine Airfoils. In
the final section, we compare our findings to the structure of the Control Systems Division for
our research company (from Chapter 4) to determine the extent to which the various IPT
structures compare with one another, and whether the similarities speak to underlying matrix
organization needs.
5.1 Case Studies: IPT deployment for C-17, and F/A-18 ElF, F-
22 and fighters.8
Since these programs were predominantly geared towards the USAF as the customer, this is a
unique opportunity to understand the driving force behind the philosophy of requiring IPD/IPT
8 Challenges and Benefits to the Implementation of Integrated Product Teams on Large Military Procurements by
Christopher M. Hernandez: Sloan Management Thesis, MS, MIT, 1996
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development as a part of the contract by the customer. This underlying philosophy to managing
programs is defined by the USAF as:
"A Philosophy that systematically employs a teaming offunctional disciplines to
integrate and concurrently apply all necessary processes to produce an effective
and efficient product that satisfies customer's needs". [8]
This philosophy is captured by the use of management and organizational forces depicted below
(Figure 13). Here culture change requires the implementation of "purposeful, multi-disciplined
teamwork" based on value-focus to "the customer, the product, the process, constraints, and
organizational structure" [8]. Productfocus refers to alignment of the organization to "product
and process", up-front planning involves comprehensive end-to-end planning for "customers,
functions, and suppliers", and right-people-right-time establishes "concurrent application" of all
disciplines. Similarly, Teamwork and Communications requires management relationships and
focus on "measurable goals and objectives" using open-communication", Empowerment allows
for "decisions to be driven to the lowest possible level commensurate with risk", Seamless
Management Tools refers to the establishing of a framework to "demonstrate dependency and
interrelationships" so that "all decisions are optimized toward the ultimate user's end product",
and Integration Throughout the Life Cycle ensures strict lPD adherence.
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IPD PHILOSOPHY
TEAMWORK &
CULTURE CHANGE COMMUNICATIONS
PRODUCT FOCUS EMPOWERMENT
SEAMLESS MANAGEMENT
UIP-FRONT PLANNING TOOLS
RIGHT PEOPLE, RIGHT INTEGRATION THROUGHOUT
PLACE, RIGHT TIME LIFECYCLE
Figure 13 : "IPD Philosophy of the USAF" [81
The "AF Material Command" cites the success of the General Motors Saturn Division and
the Ford Motor Company's Taurus Division directly as a result of "changing their culture and
fostering a new organization which empowers workers", and Motorola who focused on
"employee participation and not on organizational boundaries [8].
The C-17 IPT Structure
The IPT structure for the C-17 program is given below (Figure 14). The program was
initiated in July 1982 when they "received EMD authority to proceed with a slow-paced
preliminary development order" for three prototypes (1 flight test, 2 ground based structural
articles) [8]. The program had been implemented by overlaying the concept on a pre-existing
program, which was later re-organized into the Integrated Product Team structure shown (1993,
with ~200 personnel across all teams).
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From the structure, we can see that there were 10 teams, including one level ("Weapon
Systems") and nine level II teams (7 for products, 2 for integration). These teams were
concurrently provided with the "deliverables, budget, and program master schedule"
assignments.
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C-17 Weapon System Team Membership
Prog Mgr
Engineering Business
Support Operations
Production Integration
Quality Suppliers
Air Vehicle Analysis
Integration and
Integartion
MissionAirframe Systems
Aircraft Support
Systems Systems
Avionics &
FIt Cnt -Flight Test
Systems
Training
Figure 14: "IPT Structure for the C-17 program" [8]
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The F-22 Fighter IPT structure
Meant to replace the F- 15 Eagle fighter plane, the USAF Advanced Tactical Fighter (ATF)
was to be capable of "supersonic flight without using afterburners" - super-cruise with low
observables technology). This contract was awarded to the joint Lockheed/Boeing venture, with
the first flight scheduled for 1996. This aircraft was dubbed the F-22 fighter, and an EMD
contract was awarded in 1991 for 11 prototypes (9 flying, 1 static, 1 fatigue test airframe). With
a "preliminary design review" held in April 1993 and a "critical design review" in 1995, low rate
production was anticipated for 1998. [8]
In this division, Boeing was responsible for wings, aftfuselage, power plant installation,
auxiliary power generation system, radar and infrared search and track systems and avionics
ground prototype. The organizational structure shown below (Figure 15) consisted of one
"Weapon System Integration Team" and four product teams. [8]
The IPT structure was product-based and empowered with all the resources relevant for
successful delivery of the product. In the reporting structure, it is important to point out the
dotted-line hierarchy where the "Program Manager [had] three functional Directors: Business
Management, Manufacturing, and Engineering reporting to him, with the directors themselves
reporting to both the Program Manager as well as their ownfunctional VPs [8]. All Team
Leaders reported directly to the Program Manager, and also had their own Deputy Leaders (who
were normally functional experts in their relevant or upcoming domains).
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F22 IPT Structure
e Manager
FProgram
Weapon
System .---
Integation
Business Engring
Material Logistics
Quality Manf Chief.Pilot
Test TAC Reqrnt
I I U I
Air Vehicle Training Sys Support Sys Systems Test
Prod Mgr Prod Mgr Prod Mgr Prod Mgr
Figure 15: "IPT Structure for the F-22 Fighter Program" [8]
The F/A-18 E/F Fighter IPT Structure
"Follow-on to earlier F/Al 8As and other USN tactical aircrafts... and a replacement for the
cancelled A12", the F/A-18 E/F was to be jointly developed by the McDonnell Douglas (now
Boeing) and Northrop Grumman Corporation(s). The EMD contract was started in 1992 for
seven prototypes (5 E's and 2 F's, plus three airframes), with first flight planned for 1995 and
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production scheduled for late 1998. The IPT structure for this program is shown below (Figure
16). A vivid difference in this program was the presence of three phases: Product Development,
Product Delivery and Product Support phases, "supported by having members from the
downstream phases participating with the upstream phases". Also particular to this program was
the conception of a Leadership Team, the task of which was to effectively "remove barriers in
the work-path of the individual Product teams. The Leadership Team itself was comprised of
"key functional managers who report to their respective functional managers" along with a
dotted-line to the Program Manager. [8]
F/A-18 E/F IPT Structure
Program
Manager
L.edership Tamr
Prog Sys Program Product Subcontract
Engring & Independent Assurance Management
Integration Analysis
Business Human
Management Resources
Product Product Product
Definition Delivery Support
Team Team Team
Figure 16: "IPT Structure for the F/A-18 E/F Fighter" [8]
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5.2 Case Study: IPD and IPT approaches in GE F110+ Turbine
Airfoils
"Massive downsizing led General Electric Aircraft Engines (GEAE) to approach the
development of aircraft engines in a new way" . In this new approach, several Centers of
Excellence (or COEs) were setup as predominantly self-contained entities that addressed both
process as well as the development aspects of their respective products. The five COEs thus
created were for the divisions of "Fan and Compressor airfoils, Controls and Accessories,
Product Test and Evaluation, Configurations and TACOE (Turbine Airfoils Center of
Excellence) [9].
The key difference in this new organizational setup was the use of "cross-functional
representation to integrate around key components", as opposed to "organizing around a
program" [9]. In particular we will look at the organization dynamics of the TACOE (center-of-
excellence), and then discuss the lessons learned from this new organizational setup (IPT).
New Product Introduction NPI (NPI) teams provided the structure of the teams within
TACOE, and were the equivalent of Integrated Product Teams. 80% of a team's composition
was of internal TACOE personnel, while the remaining 20% would come from the programs that
a particular team supported. Additionally, a "Leadership Team (LT) [oversaw] each NPI IPT"
in "monitoring design changes and upgrades...helping teams understand their roles and
expectations of them... ensuring that program requirements [were] properly defined, and that
program tasks [were] prioritized and visible". Each LT team itself consisted of four people from
9 Systematic IPT Integration in Lean Development Programs by TYSON R. BROWNING; MS TPP & MS
Aeronautics and Astronautics, MIT: MS Thesis, 1996
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the program and one individual from the COE, and in turn reported to a Senior Leadership Team
[9]. TACOE's organization and NPI IPT composition is shown below (Figure 17).
Turbine Airfoils
Center of Excellence
Madisonville Plant
(Cellular Organization) 1=
PEvendale Airfoils(Cellular Organization)
Quality
Sourcing
Design & Mfg. Engineering
(Cellular organization)
- Manufacturing Engineering
- Evendale Design
- Lynn Design
Aero/Thermnal/ Mechanical Engineering
(Cellular Organization)
-Aero
L Heat Transfer
-Aero Mechanical
Human Resources
Finance
Figure 17: GEAE TACOE Organizational Units [9]
There were various "lessons learned" in moving to this new NPI IPT structure for GE
Aircraft Engines - a summary of these is shown below (Figure 18):
69
* "People seem to enjoy being part of a team. Sometimes they enjoy teamwork so much and become so
attached to their team that they will reject needed help to keep 'outsiders' away"
* Not everyone will agree with the team stmcture, even if you think it is exactly what they asked for.
* Managers cannot communicate enough "It may be only here or it may be because we have experienced
major reductions in force, but if you leave any area in question the troops will presume that it will be
handled in the most inimical way they can think of."
* People's memories are short. Organizational policies that seem clear and have been announced will
suddenly disappear from everyone's minds. Communicate all changes more than once and in different
media.
* Communicate not only changes but as much of the philosophy behind them as possible. "The troops
may not understand or agree, but it helps them to know that you do think about what you are doing)'
* Communication more than a page long will not be read.
* Where personal responsibilities are changed, relate those changes to the individuals involved face-to-face
and one-on-one.
* Share concerns and fears.
Figure 18: Lessons Learned from the transition to NPI IPT structure at GEAE [9]
It is relevant here to take note of the IPT-like mechanisms that were engaged in creating and
using this new NPI-IPT team environment. The various mechanisms deployed, along with short
descriptions of each, are listed below [9]:
Systems Engineering and Interface Optimization
The systems engineering group was not a part of the COEs, but "reside separately with
various engine programs", with the number of systems engineers having gone down in
downsizing ("solely missed by teams"). Job duties and roles for systems engineering
include:
o Troubleshooting
o Test Plan and evaluation engineering
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o Overseeing requirements/specifications waivers
* Improved Information and Communication Technologies
"GEAE [used] electronic worksheets to record activities and communicate information
concisely and consistently [with] partners, customers, and suppliers" [9]. The process of
this activity is captured by their Integrated Master Plan (IMP), containing information
such as reviews, listing action items data, as well as an archive for lessons learned. In
conjunction, a Design Record Book (DRB) is used as a "collection of technical reports.
* Training
Used most frequently for "team-building" and "technical skills".
* Co-location
Co-location has been used at the COE level, though sometimes constrained by facilities
availability. This has led to "less documentation", ability for the "group to police itself
against redundancy", and a lesser number of formal meetings (replaced by more frequent
informal ones).
* Town Meetings
NPI IPTs held scheduled meetings but this was not necessarily the case at the COE level.
* Manager Mediation
Open Communication is maintained by the management team in TACOE, using such
facilities such as an "open-door policy, LT meetings, 'walking the shop'... and personal
relationships between the managers and 'the troops"'. Additionally, managers are never
directly involved at the inter-teams level, and management roles are divested from one
another (TACOE management cannot "become involved... to the point of becoming an
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HPM" (Heavyweight Product Manager), nor are any COE managers allowed to pursue
this role.
0 Participant Mediation
"GEAE has steered away from liaison roles" (this can be seen as a significant departure
from the traditional IPT structure, though IPTs do allow for omission of this role);
"Change-agents" and "Coaches" carry some burden of this role here.
* Interface "Management" groups
The Leadership Teams perform the role of interface management, "primarily between the
program and the NPI IPTs within a COE". Sometimes intervention is available (when
required) by Cost Reduction and Field Fix teams. "Design Interface Groups (DIGS) own
and monitor specific interface parameters."
* Interface Contracts and Scorecards
"These types of documents were not apparent" [9].
5.3 Lessons Learned from Implementing Integrated Product
Teams (IPTs)
In this section, we look at various implementation issues that arise in pursuing IPT
development. Implementation of Integrated Product teams requires a multi-faceted management
engagement and learning. "IPT implementation requires significant changes to the way we
organize manage and perform work". The following list of lessons learned is derived from
experience over the years at Loral Federal Systems":
1 Popick, Paul R., and Sheard, Sarah A.: Ten Lessons Learned from Implementing Concurrent Engineering and
IPTS; Systems Engineering Proceedings: Originally presented at INCOSE 1996 Symposium
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* Lesson 1 - Strong upper management commitment to drive the implementation of...IPTs
in the face of opposition is required...
Opposition to the IPT process can stem from a variety of reasons - especially from
the uncertainty involved when moving to a new role (coupled with an unclear understanding
for what the new role entails), adding to the demands that are being made in terms of product
delivery and project schedules. Another reason is that the team decision making process of
IPTs can be taken as a sign of "undermining management authority", leading managers to
"review and approve all IPT decisions", which runs counter to the desired implementation of
Integrated Product Teams. These are types of issues that upper management must overcome
in adhering with strict IPT implementation.
* Lesson 2 - Three to six months after adopting CE(s) and JPTs, there is a high level of
frustration and desire to revert to the familiar approaches. Strong leadership is required
to continue to employ...IPT approaches.
"What is my role? Does the IPT have the authority to make this decision or do we
need approval?" Similar questions begin to emerge as IPT implementation is being carried
out. The knee-jerk reaction, like in any process change, is to revert to known processes and
procedures. In this stage, strong leadership must ensure that the implementation process is
not derailed, and persevere to be establish the role model for others to follow - only then will
the "IPT... mirror the behavior of their leadership" [10].
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* Lesson 3 - Take the time to clearly define the IPT purpose, end products, customers,
process and product measures, resources, and team incentives. Encourage the IPTs to
act within their empowerment domains.
This lesson speaks to the groundwork that must be done and the process established
for proper IPT setup. Milestones can be established in creating product oriented breakdown
structures, establishing a clear IPTpurpose, identifying the IPT customers, and establishing
clear measures of success and incentives. Along these lines, product teams must include
representation from all engineering groups that address the product - "IPTs that include the
customer and users are further enhanced" [Resources, 4]. Similarly, development of team
norms (decision making, consensus, collaboration, work review) helps establish the "team's
domain of responsibility, empowerment, and resources" [10].
* Lesson 4 - Carefully define the consensus decision making procedure, when it is to be
used, and use it to make some important decisions at all levels of the organization.
Consensus decision making methods have to learned - this is especially true of IPTs
where "initially consensus decision making takes 'much much' longer" [10]. To help with
this transition, management has a responsibility to impart an understanding, limits and
boundaries of this decision making to the IPTs. Additionally, it is necessary that the decision
making be accomplished by the "smallest group that they affect within the IPTs." [10]; as
previously discussed, the leadership must adhere and practice similar consensus decision
making so that a role model is established within the culture of the organization. New
techniques can be established as a method of arriving at decisions in a fair and un-
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confrontational manner (for example, Loral Federal Systems [10] uses multi-voting and
thumb-voting to judge decision support in consensus building.
* Lesson 5 - Make the leadership (including all levels of management) and the IPTs define
record and commit to the new roles and responsibilities. Periodically the leadership and
the IPTs should review and revise the roles and responsibilities.
The need for establishing clear roles and responsibilities speaks to the inertia and
reluctance of adopting new procedures, failing which IPTs fall back to their old roles and
functions. Here a clear understanding of each role is mandated, especially with respect to
titles (such as team lead or manager). Note that we encounter a high amount of risk at this
junction in terms of the IPT abandonment in favor of old processes and functions. For
example, an "IPT may still expect a manager to bless decisions" [10], which works against
the decision making power and mandate of the IPT (see [1], [10] above).
* Lesson 6 - Effective and efficient team communication depends upon the IPT
membership recognizing which work is best done as a team, as a sub-team, and as
individuals.
Group size is an important factor in establishing IPTs. The IPT itself is the best judge
for carving out sub-teams or assigning (undertaking) individual contributions to the IPT
effort as a whole. The context of the product/project at hand determines this division of
labor, and as such provides more efficiency in both product development as well as intra-
team communication ("only speak when they have something to add" [10]). For example, at
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Loral Federal Systems, a "common team norm is to limit war stories to one minute and
debate to 5 minutes.. .otherwise the discussion is taken offline "[10].
* Lesson 7 - Establish a formal mechanism for communication between JPTs, and identify
IPT dependencies early.
The communication techniques listed above (Lesson 6) work well within the confines
of the IPT as a team but "the overall program can suffer when inter-IPT communication is
not discussed" [10]. This is where the creation of a liaison role can most benefit the
organization (see [1], [10] above). The liaison member (or department) can help "to identify
dependencies, track progress on the IPT dependencies, and lead resolution of the IPT
dependencies" which can effectively lead to a significant reduction "in the number of issues
that [have] to escalate up the organization for resolution" [10].
* Lesson 8 - Make sure that the IPTs are supported with training that defines a core set of
engineering discipline skills, interpersonal skills, IPT method skills, and project
management skills.
Inclusions in an IPT necessarily mandate better and complete training of personnel
for these new roles. "Broader responsibilities assumed by all members of the IPTs require
basic project management skills...cross discipline schedule estimating and tracking",
engineering, and interpersonal communication skills. Additionally, IPT members have to
have "practice[d] team methods (consensus decision making, facilitation,
brainstorming.. .many times before adopting them" [10].
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* Lesson 9 - Engineers and managers need to recognize and adopt a different approach to
engineering and work product development to realize the benefits of ... engineering.
This lesson addresses the issues that are "encountered.. .when introducing concurrent
development" [10]. Recall that in transition from functional to IPT product development,
functional resources are shared across multiple projects concurrently; hence an individual
may have membership in multiple IPTs simultaneously! There are multiple lessons learned
from this item: "brainstorming... sessions should be followed by a consolidation step that
publishes the session results... so that ... sub-teams [do] not constantly revisit decisions" [10].
Similarly, engineers can be flooded by "the number of comments received during the
creation step", which they must learn to deal with and effectively and consequently turn
around and "only pass on the ones which really matter" [10]. Also, understanding needs to be
nurtured for the effect that development of IPT processes can "reduce the review and rework
at the end [in lieu of] the creation sessions at the beginning" [10].
* Lesson 10 - ... IPT approaches require integration into the overall system of
management, with afocus on establishing the IPT empowerment and determining how
performance appraisals and rewards will be administered in the team environment.
Each organization may have its own set of rules for rewarding performance. Since no
one particular reward system can best address the needs of any and all organizations, it is
best to incorporate a reward system which can speak to criteria that are applicable to IPT
structures in general. Such criteria can be ascertained by addressing questions including (a)
"How is the individual appraisal related to the success of the team...? (b) Don't individual
appraisals and rewards encourage each member of the IPT to try to get individual credit for
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team activities? (c) Why doesn't the IPT or the IPT lead do the appraisals? (The IPT and IPT
lead are most aware of team member's contributions..." [10].
5.4 Lean Enterprise Value (Principles)
We now turn our focus to the broader sense in which cross-functional and matrix
organizations, as part of a Lean System, and the Lean Enterprise System in general can bring
value to an enterprise. The emphasis on functions rather than organizational roles that we have
seen above is further emphasized by the learning from the Lean Aerospace Initiative at MIT.
This point is poignantly illustrated by the five LEVPrinciples put forth in the text:
* Principle 1:
" Principle 2:
robust value
* Principle 3:
* Principle 4:
lean value
* Principle 5:
create lean value by doing the job right and by doing the right job
deliver value only after identifying stakeholder value and constructing
propositions
fully realize lean value only by adopting an enterprise perspective
address the interdependencies across enterprise levels to increase
people not just processes, effectuate lean value
Note that the principles described here are more aboutfunction and speak to the concept of value
creation at both the enterprise level as well as the external or perceived value to stakeholders
(including customers). In a similar fashion, the comparison below (Figure 19, excerpt from [11])
speaks to a divestment of thefunctional organization towards a more integrated approach. For
" Speller, Thomas H.: Principles (architecture) from: Cutcher-Gershenfeld, Joel, and Murman, Earl: Lean Enterprise
Value Insights from MIT's Lean Aerospace Initiative, 2002
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example, while the focus of the traditional Mass production enterprise has been on the product,
the Lean Enterprise necessarily has the customer as its focal point, driving towards integrating
customer-centric value into the product development process (as we learned earlier).
Similarly, we see that the Lean enterprise integrates quality into the "Prevention (built in by
design and methods)" [11] phase of product development, a characteristic of the Integrated
Product development environment (this is the Verification process mentioned in [5]); the mass
production (functional structure) enterprise addresses this as "Inspection (a second stage after
production)" [11]. This difference also validates the claim above that Integrated Product Teams
can and do eliminate re-work by addressing downstream issues right upfront in the creation
phase. This is possible as the IPT environment glues together all functions/technical expertise
the product demands rightfrom the start, hence eliminating steps in the verification and testing
phase (as these are now addressed by the appropriate technical experts in early stages of product
development). This argument is seen to hold true in the focus on improvement in comparing
mass production with lean thinking where the emphasis shifts fromfunctional thinking to project
team (IPT) thinking and infrastructure.
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Mass Production
Product
Batch and queue
Lean Thinking
Customer
Synchronized flow
and pull
Overall Aim Mastery of craft Reduce cost and Ellminate wase and
increase efficiency add valise
Quality Integration (part of inspection (a second Preventio (built In by
the craft) stage, after production) design and: meth s)
Business
Strategy
improvement
Customization
Master-driven
continuous improvement
Economies of scale
and automation
Expert-driven periodic
improvement
Flexibility and adaptability
Workforus-dlrven
contInous Improvement
Figure 19: "How craft, mass production, and lean thinking compare" [111
In emphasizing the lessons (principles) of Lean Enterprise Value "Murman et al... warn that
stagnation is possible, and unforeseen changes in technology or world circumstances can send
any industry into a permanent decline. This could happen to the world aerospace industry it is
argued, and more likely to the commercial aircraft industry, unless LEV practices are
implemented" [6, c]. Their point is not that the various measures in "down-sizing/right-sizing,
outsourcing, mergers and acquisitions", etc. are wrong but just that the "infrastructure [has] not
solved the industry's daunting long-term problems". Hence the needs for organizational
structures that can handle both lean and innovative product development in the right measure are
warranted. It is for these reasons that "flexibility and responsiveness, integrated product teams
are components of the lean enterprise approach" [11]. IPPD (Integrated Product and Process
Development and other "overarching practices of a lean enterprise" [11] are shown below
(Figure 20).
80
Focus
Operations
Craft
Task
Single items
M I 71 -I = =1 =I I
Human-edfented Practices
U Promote lean leadership at all levets
Aign and invoive al stakeholers to achieve he entarte's lean vis&n.
a Reatkrnshtps based on rrutual tust and comrntment
Etatbt, slafrle and ongoing reunhp withi the extended en~rrs
a Make deeislns at lowest appropriate level
Dosign the oranizational sfuctwend managementsystems to acceltate
and enhance decislrnakiN at Me point of &iowledge, appfiaton, and ned.
W Optrmize capability and utizatio of people
Ensfre tat pwerty trained people an vaiafbe when needed
* Coinuous focus on the custwmIr
PwactiV0 widersm and respxmd to the needs of intern and extemf Cwstoners,
a Nurture a learning environment
Provide for developmient and growth of both organkaiso' and individuals supportfor attining lean enteqptse poas.
Prwcess-oriente Prac es
a Assure seamless Infornation flow
Pft de pr sky seamless and tely transfer of, and access tq, pefinent
in (Mm ati,
w Implement antated product and process development (iPPO)
Create product through an integrated tawn effort of pee and mrwmizations
that are knowiedgeaute about and respontsbte (or 4l phases of the product's kfecycefrom concept detintkn thrmugh developrnt producion deprent ations
and suppor and tMnW diwposat
& Enstre process capab~iy and maturaun
EsMblish and maitain processes a Wof coststeny y and
thky Chwsactis at the proddct or service.
* Maintain challenges to existing processes
Enure a cultwe and systems that use qaat*e neasurement and aysk to
Wprove proces"Se olusy
a Idenify and oplinize enterprise how
Opftize te flow of prodwct ard sek either affectg cr mrbtf te process,fram concept design fr point of use.
* Maintain stabiy in changing enrwonmeot
Estabfsh strategis to ma4ntn program stabiity in a chagohg crstomer4dten
envirament
Figure 20: "Lean Overarching Processes" [11]
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Chapter Summary
Possibly because of the overall complexity of the product involved, the aerospace
industry practices the use of IPT development in one form or another. We have seen the use of
IPT both with pure matrix dominance, as well as a case where IPT had a functional influence as
well. In either case, through the use of program management, IPT leaders, and technical or team
leaders (functional), we see the persistent use of a matrix organization as opposed to either fully
functional or fully product-based team structures. Additionally we see that the motivation for the
IPT structure once again derives from values of group processes, improved communications,
decision making independence through the use of advanced IT and information tools, systems
engineering and program management functions, co-location, and other constructs we have seen
to be reflective of effective IPT characteristics.
The lessons we are told to learn are yet again reflective of those that we see consistently
being preached in cross-functional or matrix organizations: Strong management support, clear
definition of product, purpose and roles, need for effective team and inter-IPT communication,
support infrastructure, training, reward structures, and team-building amongst others - all this
with an emphasis on stakeholder value and customer need fulfillment. For this latter perspective,
the 'principles' derived from the Lean initiative provide overall guidance that points to product
robustness, determination of and adherence to stakeholder value, and a culture of human and
process-oriented practices.
In this next chapter we present and analyze our findings at the research company with
respect to their use of Integrated Product Teams in the control systems engineering division.
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Chapter 6: Case study of a large aerospace company
6.1 Company Overview
A large aerospace supplier of airplane engines was studied for organizational structure of
project teams. Product development in this engineering company is based entirely on Integrated
Product Development practices with a corresponding matrix-organization setup. Additionally,
the IPT setup has existed for the last 4 years and has had a chance to mature and fine-tune itself
over the years. This environment also provided us a chance to study the perceived differences
that exist both before and after an IPT project-style has been introduced into an organization, as
well as the motivational factor for change, and fulfillment of organizational change goals after
the implementation.
The company is primarily a defense contractor for the US government. As a result of an
acquisition, it became part of a larger aerospace company. Specifically, the division of Control
Systems of the company was analyzed with respect to the structure of IPTs. It is important to
note that the Controls Systems division of this company reported under the 'Procurement'
function of the organization, since approximately 80% of the design and implementation of
components used within the control systems division is outsourced to third-party vendors. Even
though the final integration and the overall design of the products are performed by the control
systems division, this outsourcing may be an important influence over the placement of controls
systems under procurement.
Customers of the Company include airlines, industrial corporations, and defense departments
in the United States and globally. Additionally, there are also Energy and Naval/Marine
divisions (not part of this study) to which the Company sells its engines and other products.
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Specifically, the Controls Operations Business Unit (OBU) was used as the case-study - other
major Operations Business Units in the US include Fans and Compressors, Turbines,
Combustors, and Transmissions and Structures. Note that the "Operations" Business Unit is
applicable across all the Customer Business divisions listed, signifying that manufacturing
facilities work cross-divisions without specific facilities per division.
The organizational structure of the control systems OBU is shown in figures below.
Figure 21 provides the executive and management level structure of the matrix organization. The
organizational structure of the project team members under the management of the functional
groups to which they also report is typical. Figure 22 depicts the functional structure of the
Procurement organization. This information will be analyzed with respect to our learning in the
Summary and Analysis chapter, where we will look at these organizational structures and
compare them with the IPT structures of various other aerospace companies that have been
deployed over time.
A questionnaire was presented to the Engineering Director, IPT Leads, Engineering/Resource
Managers, Controls Lead Engineers, and buyers at the Company (see Appendix A: Interview
Questionnaire for the questions). A total of 10 people were interviewed including the
Engineering Director, two Buyer/procurement specialist (one manager), two Controls Lead
Engineers (CLEs), 2 Integrated Product Team (IPT) Leads, and 3 engineering
managers/supervisors. A summary of the responses and analysis of the major themes and issues
discovered is presented in the next section. Appendix D: Interview Demographics provides a
brief description of the interviewee demographic, as well as some descriptions of the roles of
each category of interviewee.
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6.2 Organization Change
Perception of the Company's Organizational Structural Change
In 2000, the Controls OBU was formed, prior to which Controls engineering was part of
engineering and Controls Purchasing was part of purchasing. The new organizational structure is as
depicted in Figure 21 above. The department specifically has moved from a functional/product
management to a more skills-based system. That is the organization has moved from a function-
based to a program based system (at least in management of programs). Whereas a Controls
Engineering Supervisor (typically a systems engineer (SE)) was in charge of both the technical and
management aspects of a given program in the past, the new structure has moved the Controls
engineering supervisors to the role of Resource Managers while the IPT Lead is now in charge of the
programs. A significant aspect has been the move of controls under the procurement umbrella (this
is perceived by some as perhaps controls have more of a procurement focus, but the motivation is
not clear for this structure). Some in management perceive of the controls organization as being
"organized functional matrix with functional-skill access". The introduction of the IPT Lead role is
also a relatively new phenomena, the "motivation for which is not entirely clear". Some perceive of
the organization as one that has changed from "an engineering company to a business", where
program management and "schedule" responsibilities are acknowledged.
With respect to the purchasing, the change has the added "support in procurement" now as
opposed to the old role where "the buyer had a larger role but had difficulty managing".
Perception of motivation for organizational change
Several factors seem to have led to the organizational change, a shift from product/functional to a
functional/matrix organization. At the introduction of the Integrated Product Team structure, the
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Control OBU was merged with Procurement, which meant that the organization "had to change
anyway". With passage of time, the organization with respect to IPTs has become more structured
and process-oriented. Another motivational factor was that uniformity of organization was
mandated by certification authorities. Some personnel felt that since this change from "product to
discipline-based organization" was just what the leadership wanted ("came from the GM's office)
and was thus mandatory, while others thought of this as a cultural shift towards that of the parent
company. This change was also perceived of as a catalyst for "enhancing the relationship between
the Customer-Facing Business Units (CFBUs) and [the corresponding] CLEs" and for generating
more of a "project-management focus".
Another feeling for this change was that "two-thirds of the managers had moved on" since
the acquisition of the US company. This meant that there were in fact fewer managers available and
hence sharing these "resources" provided the required consistent "skills-based methodology".
Others who were part of the acquired company feel positively about this change and relate it to the
Company's overall strategy of sustaining profits by creating a true business environment. To this
effect, the authority and accountability afforded to program managers is viewed as a positive change.
An additional position created at this junction was that of the CAM (Controls Account Manager)
which is a floating role taken on by existing personnel - this too is perceived of as a wise "business
move for tracking plans".
IPT Leads and Engineerig (Resource) Managers
As mentioned above, one significant change has been the introduction of the IPT Lead where the
systems engineer/functional managers were in charge before the organizational change. Some of the
roles and focus of the two new roles are shown in Figure 23 below. A detailed description of the
two roles has been provided in Appendix C: Job Roles and Descriptions [ 12]2].
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With respect to the reporting structure, Resource (Engineering) managers are still responsible for
maintaining and providing the various functional skill sets needed in program development. These
managers work with the CLEs in determining the right mix of particular resources for each of the
programs initiated in the controls division. Some resource managers have now been assigned the
task of process development for across-the-division rollout, in addition to their supervisory roles.
The IPT Lead is the program manager within controls for programs initiated by the CFBU (note
that there is a separate program manager resident in CFBU as well). IPT Leads typically have
responsibility for multiple simultaneous programs and will assign a Controls Lead Engineer (CLE)
for large specific program. The IPT Leads work directly with the CLE to develop the
program/product, who in turn provide the technical expertise, systems engineering (though they can
sometimes choose to assign the systems task to another senior engineer on the team), and technical
program management capabilities.
Figure 23: Roles and Responsibilities of IPT Leads and Engineering Managers
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6.3 Perceived impact of change
Perception of the strengths of current ornuanization.
The current organizational structure has led to a "good working relationship with the FAA in
[standardizing] consistent processes. The controls division also has developed a "strong focus on
doing the job right" (business focus). Managers in general also feel that the current structure suffices
for current needs with perhaps a want for proper prioritization and resource constraints management.
To this effect, process management is highly appreciated, helped partly by the fact that Controls is
now quasi-independent by not strictly being a part of the engineering organization (Controls OBU is
considered a separate business unit). Overall, the "business orientation" of the controls unit coupled
with ongoing "process improvement" efforts is highly valued.
The customer focus attained through the program management of the IPT Lead role is also
considered a vital change that maintains the company's emphasis on business. Similarly, the CLE
role creation enhances the "increased focus and greater accountability" required from lead engineers
on projects. Flexibility afforded to the CLEs in their ability to assign/pick a systems engineer as a
lead engineer (and become more program focused themselves), along with ability for CAM role
delegation is considered valuable. CLEs felt that this provided directly for better resource balancing
and allowed for more emphasis on Earned Value Management (EVM).
In general, "processes today" are perceived of having (positively) "gone beyond the initial
Integrated Product Management (IPM)" goals. This shift is also appreciated for the "present
process-based organizational workings" employed at the company now. "Quality and business
improvement have been tremendous in the past five years" and the resulting improvement of process
has attained a "broadened scope".
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Along the buyer roles, there is appreciation of innovation and change management in the
company, from the symbolic fact that "the old building is being torn down" to the updated
production lines (switch to flow lines) as well as lean-process and continuous improvement
processes. Over time, the process changes have been manifested in improved relationship with
suppliers while the effective use of the facilities can now be used to leverage the suppliers as well.
Resulting processes such as "aggregate resource balancing" and "programmatic focus" are
viewed as positive outcomes of this organizational shift. The shift "allows for better
performance.. .and a drive to make continuous improvements" by providing "specialists for each
specific role". Additionally, the increased program-management and business-focus "are in the right
direction". Other measurable factors positively influenced by this change include performance, cost-
reduction, and reduced supply-base. The creation of a logistics department also seems to have
reduced "50-60% of purchasing workload".
Current issues
However, some confusion has been created in the twin-reporting structure (inherent to all matrix
organizations) as a consequence. For some the "boss has two bosses plus a global boss". Similarly,
there is a feeling that "people get moved around when working on 2 - 8 different projects"
simultaneously. This also has ramifications on the "learning-curve" required where the move from
project-to-project is more frequent, resulting in an added "loss of a sense of pride". Consequently
the need for people resources has also introduced a "gaming" factor when request are made for
people resources, which has a significant impact with respect to cost-benefit analysis and
prioritization.
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With respect to the mechanics of the organization, managers feel that at times "head-count
may not be correlated to the project-size" requiring a better need for overall resource constraint
management. However, resource balancing has become more manageable in recent times. The
creation of the CLE role has brought "awareness of cost/scope/timing issues" and responsibility for
these where there was none in the past (the "CLEs are rated on this performance by the IPT leads").
In addition, the interviews highlighted three main areas of concern: the role of project management
versus systems engineering, the IPT lead role, and overall alignment of goals and objectives across
the organization.
PM versus SE
During the acquisition and since, the company has seen engineering talent erode as personnel
left the company, especially with respect to systems engineers. There have also been "difficulties
with relationship in program management and engineering management". As a result the company
is trying to split the "what and when" (program management) from the "how" (engineering) which
has "not been easy". They strive to balance the program management business skills versus the
systems engineering technical skills. Some managers also felt that there was simply a lack of a
globally voiced strategy for the controls OBU in general.
Managers also feel that there is much need for proper training of systems engineers,
especially for those who are to take the role of CLE down the road. Similar thoughts were shared by
IPT leads on the need for program management skills of lead and systems engineers. IPT leads also.
felt that they lacked full control over the engineering personnel because of the matrix structure
(engineers are accountable only to their direct supervisors). A "healthy adversarial relationship" now
exists between "technology and management" and there is a desire to have CLEs be "good systems
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engineers to manage specific programs" as well as "technical managers" to partake in the desired
program management focus. On other hand, while personnel strive for management positions, the
CLE role is not perceived of as the desired management function.
IPT lead role
The role of the IPT lead is perceived of as a dangling role. This role and function itself "is not
clear", neither is the motivation for the creation of the role (some feel that the CLE is already
performing this role, in conjunction with the program managers at the CFBU level). Others are not
convinced that the better project focus and management have necessarily come about because of the
new IPT Lead role (in the past, the "Systems Engineer" communicated directly with the CFBU).
On the contrary, there is general consensus that the IPT lead role itself is "very ill-defined". IPT
leads are sometimes seen as an unnecessary barrier between the CFBU program manager and the
CLE on the project. This role also seems to have developed more of a supplier-focus where the
consensus is that the role should be both "supplier and customer-focused" (this is related to the sheer
number of programs that an IPT lead manages simultaneously).
Alignment of goals/objectives
There is also a perception of a greater need for integration with the rest of the engineering
organization. Some of this disconnect is placed squarely on the intervening role played by the IPT
leads which "remove direct interfacing with the CFBUs". Similarly, "communication gaps exist
between stakeholders and the engineering organization" while there is a significant "need for more
teamwork between the various groups". This disconnect sometimes leaves the impression that
personnel are not working "towards a common goal", which is a basic tenet of IPT development.
93
With respect to product development, no Controls OBU input is required or accepted during the
preliminary new engines design phase; hence Controls is simply left out of early design phase
development.
In terms of the matrix organization, many individuals felt that there were "too many layers,
where the program direction goes back and forth". As mentioned earlier, there is a need for the
technical and program management focus to come together so that the technical cost and schedule
tradeoffs can be balanced in light of the program management ability to influence pressure on any
given program. For example, Black Belt project teams "are only interested in the process part, and
are not the kind we need", influenced by the fact that the Black Belt projects do not have their own
budgets and hence are influenced by their reporting hierarchy. The reporting structures also appear
to be confusing to some personnel; pockets of collocation issues were also present.
"People are sometimes so "process enmeshed" that they appear to lose sight of common
sense", and hence there is a need to strike a "fine balance". There is a need to integrate the
organization at a global level so that team-based efforts are more efficient. At a higher level, there is
also a need for more R&D programs not affiliated with on-going product programs and deliverables.
Interviewees felt that the current flagship products are in a "down turn mode" with a high rate of
"quality escapes". More importantly, there are no "innovation" and "strictly R&D" programs on the
horizon.
Chapter Summary
There has been significant change at the company and, generally speaking, it has been viewed as
positive. Some of the important changes have been with respect to the move to an IPT/matrix
structure where the focus for the company has shifted towards the business aspects of meeting
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customer needs. This increased customer focus has been augmented by the new and improved
process structure that has evolved as the IPT implementation at the company has matured.
As would be expected in any major organizational change such as the introduction of IPTs, there
are a number of issues that remain to be addressed. Some of these issues include the division of
work between the program manager and the systems engineering functions, which has led to
confusion over the roles of the IPT Lead with respect to the interaction between the CLE and the
project Customer Facing Business Unit.
The final chapter will analyze these issues relative to the earlier literature review.
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Chapter 7: Summary and Analysis
Analysis
IPT structure from other case-analysis
We see that the C/17 IPT program implementation is similar to that of the company in that there
are IPT leads for each of the major programs. The differences lie (minor) in that the IPTs are
provided with the ""deliverables, budget, and program master schedule" in the C/i 7 program while
the company's IPTs normally create these from the efforts of the IPT lead and the CLE working in
conjunction with the CFBU Program Manager. Additionally, in the C/17 program, the IPT Leads
are direct reports to the program manager, while this is not the case with the company.
However, the F22 program in contrast did not utilize an IPT structure (as seen at the company)
but was in fact more product based - the program manager was however reported to directly by the
team leaders of various programs, as well as three functional directors: Business Management,
Manufacturing, and Engineering. For the F/A-i 8 team structure, we see that the IPT Lead role is
taken over by a "leadership team", while the IPTs themselves exist directly under the program
manager. We also note that there is an existence of some form of a "program management" office or
team in each of these initiatives but the existence of such an entity was not obvious at the company.
We also note that the GEAE TACOE IPT team composition is more 'holistic' than that observed
at the company (or in the other case-studies) in that it incorporates such departments as HR and
Finance functions directly into the IPT structure. However, the size of the effort may be a
motivation for this setup at GEAE. Additionally, the processes defined in integration are typical IPT
processes (for example laid out by Bert et al above).
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In general, we see that the practices in IPT development at the company are very similar to those
employed in comparable organizations. However, the comparison case-studies deploy these
practices more globally within the organization, while our study of the company was at a specific
division level (controls). We also have reason to believe that the processes for IPT development
encountered at the company's control division may not be deployed globally across the company
(see issues of aligning goals and objectives globally). In so far as the controls division is concerned,
we find that the team and product development practices are the same in comparable organizations,
especially in that programs were being driven by IPT leads (program managers) in conjunction with
'team leads' (SE/CLE) at the engineering level.
PM versus SE
Earlier we found that it was unclear what definitions and job responsibilities applied to each
of these roles at the company. From the system engineering perspective, we find that (given
company role descriptions and the findings of Bert et al above: see functional decomposition of the
systems engineering role), the systems engineering role is accomplished most by the CLE or a senior
engineer on IPT projects at the company. In addition, the CLE also performs some of what Bert el al
find are pertinent to the program management role. This hybrid is not contrary to our findings,
especially when we discovered that companies sometimes train the systems engineers for program
management roles. However, it was not clear whether the IPT leads at the company provide for all
the program management skills set out by Bert et al, though overall the IPT lead role closely
parallels that of the program manager.
In addition, in comparing the IPT structures at other similar companies, we found that most
programs had a "leadership team" or a "program management office". With respect to the controls
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division we are not clear whether such a function is fulfilled by the program managers at the CFBU
level, or whether there this 'office' has been decomposed into the various functions of the CLEs, IPT
leads, and the Resource Managers. Further research would be needed to qualify (and justify) the
need of such an entity (program management office) at the company.
IPT Lead Role
As discussed above, the role played by the IPT lead is not entirely clear to the company
(controls division). The roles defined for the IPT lead closely resemble those of a program manager,
and these program managers in most companies are derived from a central organizational structure
(functional) that houses the program management expertise, lending it to various programs and
projects on an as-needed basis.
In addition, we find that there is sometimes a conflict in the roles played by the CLE and the
IPT Lead in terms of the program management function. The motivation of CLE program
management functions are not clear (duplicate program management between CLE and IPT Lead)
and hence raise the question whether the IPT lead position is really helpful in intermediating
between the CFBU and engineering. Note that the lesson learned from Popick et al [10] about the
necessity of clear definition of IPT member roles is clearly applicable here. Once again, we would
need to look at the various programs for perhaps function-based skills or other motivating factors for
this position.
Alieninz Goals/Objectives
With respect to the perceived discrepancies in alignment of goals and objectives, the use of
effective knowledge management techniques laid out earlier (Finegold et al) can address some of
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these, especially in conjunction with the process initiative already in place at the company. For
example, the framework presented speaks to streamlining via automation, as well as R&D initiatives,
both of which appear as perceived issues at the company. Additionally, this 'need for tighter
integration' may be an issue of propagating controls' processes throughout the organization so that
synergies can result. This need for clear definition and tighter integration is lesson 10 from Popick
et al: IPT approaches require integration into the overall system of management, with a focus on
establishing the IPT empowerment. Further research would be required to study the company-wide
information-sharing and program management knowledge sharing systems already in place at the
company to determine whether in fact the knowledge management infrastructure is supportive of
inter-team IPT development.
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Conclusion
We have seen that whereas functional organizations look to build around commonality, bringing
"together activities which bear on a common product, common customer, common geographic area,
common business function or common process" [1], the matrix organization looks to implement an
organizational structure that essentially lies somewhere in the middle ground of the functional and
product organizations - in reality a pure matrix organization is exactly at the center of the spectrum
between the two other forms. More importantly, it is a set of common, goal oriented results that the
Integrated Product Team achieves that marks its difference from the singularly focus functional or
more broadly based product teams.
With respect to the hardships faced by stable product-based companies in introducing new
products with minimal lead time, we find that "given the executive will", combined with "the
structure [and] the organizational separation with senior team integration" can help any
"company.. .become ambidextrous" [2].
In comparing program management roles with those of systems engineering, we see that the
implicit integration of the two functions occurs when the "conflict.. .on who claims responsibility for
a specific function..." is replaced by organizing "around customer needs and wants and not
organizational functions" [3]. Here the emphasis on the role and authority is replaced with the need
for a functional decomposition of the customer's needs and team-wise discipline and membership is
emphasized.
With respect to Effective IPT characteristics, we noted the various characteristics of effective
IPTs for both low risk as well as high risk products. Notably, we saw that factors such as bridging
cultural barriers, encouraging team membership, and team-based decision making are highly
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important and, while low-risk projects are effective with IPT-based dominance, a 50/50 balance of
IPT/Functional dominance works well for high-risk projects. With respect to the Susman analysis,
we found that managers can use the analysis results (findings such as "team decision making and
project-based rewards are directly related to project outcomes ") to "counter-balance the potentially
negative affects of function-based differentiation on product development projects", and gain
"leverage by providing team members with rewards that are based on project outcomes". Similarly,
"team-member involvement in decision-making can also lead to favorable project outcomes".
We also studied Wheelwright et al's four types of dominant team structures, each with its
own set of project leadership and organization nuances, and strengths and weaknesses. We found
that the characteristics of the heavyweight team structure were most representative of IPTs and, in
the ability to ramp up for innovation and new product research, the autonomous or tiger team
structure was ideal. In terms of knowledge management with an emphasis on organizational
processes, Finegold et al show us that the alignment of five key elements of an organizations design:
strategy, structure, processes, rewards, and people "increase... focus on the activities required for
effective knowledge management" [6]. The information and knowledge management framework
presented is an essential and vital part of any effective IPT function. On similar lines, we pursued
arguments that have now begun to surface that question the validity of constant structural change,
with some who "disparage.. .the widespread malady of 'structuritis', whose principal symptom is the
propensity to issue a new organization chart as the first solution to any business problem". [7] In
response, Oxman et al argue for the creation "more of a results orientation by focusing on
nonstructural issues such as people, processes, and rewards", in line with the analysis above.
With respect to the company research we compared the IPT structure of the controls division
with that of programs and projects at various companies, including those at GEAE and Boeing. We
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then went on to look at the various lessons learned in implementing effective Integrated Product
Teams, as well as some key findings of the Lean Aerospace Initiative program here at MIT. In
addition, the issues of definition of systems engineers versus project manager responsibilities, the
definition and role of the IPT lead, and the need for global alignment goals and objectives are
possible candidates for further research.
We started out this research looking for the inner workings that make Integrated Product
Teams such a highly valued organizational proposition for complex engineering firms. In doing this
research we find that indeed the flavor or degree of implementation (lightweight to heavyweight) on
an IPT structure can be utilized to address just about any industry and organization involved with
product development. While functional organizations as well as product or project structures serve
well in established industries/firms (cost over performance), we find that in fact the IPT structure can
not only be used in these situations but has the added value of being able to address new product
development requiring business and technological innovation.
It is the flexibility that the IPT structure offers that lays at the core of the value it provides.
By sharing functional resources, IPTs are able to provide new development with cost and budget as
primary focus (resource balancing). However, since resources are borrowed, we find that need not
be detrimental to the technical development of employees (functional-dominance in IPT structures).
In fact, constant exposure to new and innovative projects can be expected to raise employee
awareness (knowledge) and bring a more systems focus to the organization (a systems-focused, as
opposed to a product-at-hand focused, organization has its own set of advantages). But to be able to
harvest these benefits, the management must nourish and provide appropriate leadership to the
organization, especially with respect to factors deemed effective and vital for IPT development.
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This nourishment comes first in the form of the implementation strategy that must be
followed when bringing IPT development to an organization, and then in the form of continued
support. The basic team-membership tenet of IPT development mandates that the organizational
leadership lead by example - from independence in decision-making to delegating authority and
appropriate power to the IPT teams. Not only is team-building within the team a crucial factor, the
spirit of mutual respect must pervade all managerial functions - from functional managers, to
project, program, and product management (where applicable). To this end, it is necessary that clear
roles be defined, while cross-pollination is simultaneously encouraged by mechanisms such as
job/function rotation, among others.
But changing structures organizationally can only go so far in aligning a firm with its core
business. A far more important factor in the deployment of team structures (including IPTs) is the
use of processes and support infrastructure. For one, knowledge management plays a fundamental
role by bringing a process focus to the firm in the value of knowledge capture. Other factors that
contribute and are thus necessary in continued support include a reward system that acknowledges
the team structure and emphasizes performance, a training system that looks to continually develop
the firm's most valuable knowledge asset (it's employee), and process management, among others.
With respect to teams engaged in systems engineering and program management, we see that
once again functional decomposition of the task at hand is a better technique in bringing value to the
end-customer as well as the stakeholder. Hence the systems focus must be adhered to at every level
of systems architecting and development. To this effect, we can utilize the lessons learned from the
Lean Aerospace Initiative and adapt the principles of stakeholder and customer value (with respect
to both upstream as well as downstream functions) to our own organization. An important aspect of
this division between the engineering and management functions is that both be keenly aware of the
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others goals and provide support to one another where applicable. That is, the overlapping of these
roles can in fact be a sign of positive synergy between the two functions in attaining a common goal.
Overall it is not possible to identify a single organizational structure as the right fit for a
particular product (or classes of products) every time. Organizations must adapt the team-style that
works best for their needs, using organizational structure research as a guide. We have seen
companies that deploy multiple styles within the same organization to achieve multiple goals
simultaneously, while others repeat the process against the same structure. Once an organization
creates the appropriate process and support infrastructure, choosing an organizational design for a
project or a product can in fact become second nature.
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Further Research
We noted that both in our research company and elsewhere, the roles of systems engineering
versus program management cannot be universally defined. Though we looked at literature where
the two functions were divisible, it is not entirely clear how the two functions differed at the highest
levels - that is, in the case of team leadership. Further research needs to be done on the topic of
determining whether in fact systems engineers that come up the ranks can be effective managers, and
if so, what roles and training need be undertaken. Similarly, by and large we find program managers
come from a business management background with little or no systems engineering knowledge.
Yet they are able to successfully accomplish program management functions in engineering
organizations. Further research can help us ascertain the kinds of organizations (industry) where this
is successful in contrast with industries where the necessity of engineering knowledge in a program
manager is mandated.
Another area of further study is the issue of aligning divisional goals with those of a global
corporation, in the practice of deploying IPTs. Our research was focused mainly at a few
departments while literature points to the need for a clear business strategy in every organization.
What needs to be discerned is whether a process or practice can be created in forcing alignment of
goals and objectives. For this, case studies at large companies with multiple team structures
successful at this practice can be utilized to further our understanding in this area.
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Appendix A: Interview Questionnaire
Target: All (Directors, Managers, IPT Leads, Chief Design, Chief Lead, HR, Procurement
Specialists).
Company History:
(0) How long have you been with the organization in its current location?
(1) What are the various functions or responsibilities you have undertaken?
(2) What is your core expertise or area of work?
(3) What is the (COMPANY) organizational structure and how has it changed over the years?
(a) Why have the changes come about? What was the motivation for these changes?
(b) What specific changes are most prominent?
(c) How have the motivating issues been addressed with the change?
Company Today:
(4) Can you compare and contrast some of the salient and vivid differences between the
COMPANY and your previous company?
(5) Any general comments on issues other than the ones mentioned here?
(6) What do you think are the strengths of the current organization and the way it is setup?
(7) What do you think are the weaknesses of the current organization and the way it is setup?
(8) Looking forward over the next 2-5 years, what organizational issues do you expect to
show up?
(9) How well do you think the current organization will be able to address these issues?
(10) Did you move to the COMPANY from another company? If yes, what was your initial
reaction to the COMPANY organization?
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Appendix B: Hypothesis Statement and Regression results for
Susman Analysis
Hi: Project focus is related positively to project outcomes. In particular, team
leader strength, project-based rewards, and co-location are related positively
to project outcomes.
This hypothesis essentially states that "if Project Focus" counterbalances the
effects of functional-based organizational structures.. .then its effectiveness
should facilitate achievement of 'Project Outcomes".
H2: Group process partially mediates the relationship between project outcomes
and team leader strength, project-based rewards, and co-location.
This hypothesis tests the strength of the model (see Figure 8) to investigate the
relationship between the "Project Focus" variables (team leader strength,
project-based rewards, and co-location) and "Group Process".
H3: Codification is related positively to project outcomes.
This hypothesis states that "data and guidelines that can be accessed more
reliably and quickly should lead to more successful project outcomes".
H4: Risk positively moderates the mediational effect of group processes on the
relationship between project focus and project outcomes.
This hypothesis tests the degree of moderation by "Risk" between "Group
Process" and "Project Outcomes"
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H5: Risk negatively moderates the relationship between
codification/computerization and project outcomes.
This hypothesis tests the degree of moderation by "Risk" between
"Codification/Computerization" and "Project Outcomes"
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Figure 24 : Regression results for Susman et al study [5]
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Appendix C: Job Roles and Descriptions [12]
Position Responsibilities-Controls Lead Engineer
The Controls Lead Engineer (CLE) is responsible for delivering the project on schedule and to
budget.
The principle responsibilities/accountabilities of the CLE include:
eDeliver the project by meeting the specification, budget, schedule, and milestones.
*Maintain and report project budgets/schedules through the formal Management Cost System
(MCS).
eFacilitate planning and execution of project work.
eAssess and manage technical risks to meet critical project deliverables.
eUnderstand and properly manage the interfaces between hardware, software, and systems
engineering to maximize engineering productivity and reduce program risk.
eFacilitates, investigates, and implements alternatives to accommodate technical vs. schedule
issues.
eSpecify the key project activities that need to be carried out to meet the project milestones.
eIdentify, manage, and mitigate project risks to an acceptable level.
*Authorize the starting and stopping of project work.
eDetermine the amount, timing, and type of human and physical resources needed to meet
the project requirements.
*Obtain commitment from Resource Managers for the allocation of resources.
*Act as the focal point for all aspects related to the project
*Provide the IPT Lead and CFBU Program Manager with information necessary to manage
the overall program and related programs.
The knowledge, skills, and experience required by the CLE include:
" BS or equivalent college degree with a major in engineering, science, physics, or
equivalent training.
* Seven or more years of experience in the area of gas turbine engines, or related
experience.
* Demonstrated ability to lead and coordinate teams in quest of a common goal.
* Demonstrated ability to facilitate acceptable compromises between technical and
schedule/cost issues.
* Proficiency in written and oral communication using the English language.
* Demonstrated knowledge of the interplay of the engineering disciplines that affect gas
turbine engine design decisions.
* Demonstrated skill in the use of program planning tools and cost accounting/reporting
systems.
* Proficiency in exhibition of Company IPM Leadership Behaviors.
III
Position Responsibifities--Engineering Director
Key Accountabilities
" Provide engineering design and development leadership within the OBU.
* Develop and implement Company engineering "make-buy" strategy in
conjunction with the Parent-Company Control Systems Operating Unit
engineering strategy.
* Acquire leading edge technology consistent with Parent Company Control
Systems Operating Unit engineering strategy to ensure continuing leadership.
* Deliver engineering solutions to the Integrated Product Team Leaders at the right
time, cost, and quality, meeting all airworthiness requirements.
" Provide expert engineering support throughout the product life cycle.
" Secure compliance with common professional standards and protocols for OBU
engineering, including Joint Ventures and sub-contractors.
* Support and implement relevant BPD improvement programs and other
improvement initiatives.
* Improve and standardize engineering processes across the global Control
Systems community.
* Develop the professional competency of OBU Engineering professionals.
. Support the cultural change to team-based operations.
Key Competencies Key Relationships
* Judgment * OBU Integrated Product Team Leaders
Use technical excellence to address To deliver program requirements
complex technical issues.
* Product Awareness * Parent Company Control Systems
Be familiar with the product and expert in Operating Unit-Engineering Director
the sub-system area. To ensure maximum legal integration of
strategies and deliveries of all R&T and
R&D activities
* Leadership * CFBU Engineering Directors
Communicate the business vision and build To ensure "fit" and integration of the
ownership and commitment to customer product
satisfaction.
" Development of Teams / Individuals 0 Product Engineering & Technology
Create the engineering excellence to deliver Director
continuous improvement. To align technology and capability
" Operational Unit-All Team Members
To achieve common objectives
* Research World, including University
Technology Centers
To develop new expertise and sub-
contract research
" Suppliers
To ensure engineering specifications are
met
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Position Responsibilities-Integrated Product Team Leader
" Achieve customer satisfaction through program management excellence and
management of customer expectations
* Negotiate program requirements and agree priorities with Customer Facing
Business Units
* Negotiate schedule, budget, and resource supply demands with internal
stakeholders
* Negotiate resource demands and conduct program reviews with strategic
suppliers
* Meet cost, schedule, and specification requirements on committed / accepted
engineering programs by directing the efforts of Controls Lead Engineers
* Manage program risks by implementing appropriate assessment and mitigation
strategies
* Manage flow of program goods / services with the Customer Facing Business
Units and Suppliers
* Manage product configuration and entry
Boards, Safety Boards, etc.
Key Competencies
* Achievement
Focus and drive to achieve business
objectives-
* Strategic Perspective
Determine strategy to balance demands
for product development, product
maintenance, and product improvement
against available resource-
* Negotiation Skill
Establish win-Avin solutions.
4 Communication
Establish dear communication with
customers and suppbers to ensure
achievement of objectives.
* Creativity
Find and demonstrate new and better
ways to do things.
into service through Product Change
Key Relationships
# CFBU Program Manager
To understand and influence customer
requirements
9 OBU Engineering Director I Supervisors
To ensure delivery of internal goods/
services on time and at the committed cost
OBU Purchasing Director
To ensure delivery of supplied goods/
services on time and at the committed cost
* OBU Quality Director
To address in-service quality issues
* Operational Unit-All Team Members
To support the team in achieving objectives
anywhere in the unit
* OBU Suppliers
To manage programs
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Position Responsibilities-Controls Supervisor
Manages, directs, plans, coordinates and supervises a group of professional engineers
and/or technical personnel engaged in the design and development of products. Makes
decisions and recommendations recognized as authoritative having an important impact
on engineering activities. Initiates and maintains extensive contacts with key engineers
and officials of other organizations and companies. Requires skills in persuasion and
the negotiation of critical issues, as well as demonstrated creativity, foresight, and
mature engineering judgment in anticipating and solving unprecedented engineering
problems.
Controls Engineering - Specific Position Responsibilities may include one or more of
the following:
" Design, development and support of control systems for a defined range of
engines.
" Integration of the control system with other air vehicle or customer-defined
systems.
" Design, development and demonstration of advanced control systems and
components.
" Development of on-board engine monitoring systems, trend analysis models and
ground station analysis systems for a defined range of engines.
* Providing support to Controls Engineering Project groups in terms of design,
definition, development and support of sensors, harnesses and components.
" Providing support to Controls Engineering Project groups in terms of planning
and conduct of EMI and lightning test programs.
* Ensuring a common approach wherever possible across the various engine
control groups for specification and selection of sensors, harnesses and
components.
* Ensuring a common approach across the various engine control groups for
software requirements specification, software verification and validation
assessment and software definition and control methods.
" Integration of Rolls-Royce Corporation methods, procedures and systems with
those of other Rolls-Royce family Companies
Generic Supervisory Duties and Responsibilities:
* Manages an important segment of the engineering organization. Supervises
several engineers and/or technical personnel.
* Directs/manages a major engineering program containing very complex elements
or the interaction of complex or conflicting requirements. Scope of responsibility
is that of technical, budget and schedule performance.
* Participates in the screening and hiring of potential candidates. Trains and
develops subordinates and makes recommendations related to personnel
actions.
* Communicates research/development efforts through interaction with peers and
regular reporting, publication and oral presentation.
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* Conceives and plans investigations of technical activities of the highest level of
difficulty requiring both innovation and the application of extensive practical
experience in the field.
* Initiates, conducts, and directs research/development programs and/or serves as
a technical specialist in area of specialization.
* Solves complex problems of the highest degree of difficulty through insight and
the application of the most advanced techniques available.
* Conceives markets and prepares saleable engineering programs.
* Develops and maintains long range plans for technology/program needs.
* Administers and promotes cost, safety and quality initiatives.
Knowledge, Skills and Abilities:
* BSME or equivalent college degree with a major in engineering, science or
equivalent training. M.S. /PhD. preferred (may be required in some instances).
* Training in research/design/development methodology (on the order of 10 years
or more) pertinent to gas turbine engine technology.
* Demonstrated advanced knowledge of engineering/science in principal
specialties.
* High level of analytical ability where problems are unusual and extremely difficult.
* Highly developed oral and written communication skills.
* High level of interpersonal skills to work effectively with others, motivate
employees and elicit work output.
* Demonstrated leadership in directing team activity in problem solving.
. Demonstrated ability to serve as a mentor.
. Completion of recommended corporate training programs.
115
Appendix D: Interview Demographics
Tenure and experience-levels of interviewees
The range of employment years for the interviewees was 4.5 - 26 years of service with the
Company. The average length of employment was about 12.5 years. Most personnel had either
joined from the parent company after the acquisition of a US corporation, while others had been
with the US Company and had stayed on after the acquisition.
Functions and Responsibilities of Interviewees
Personnel in the controls systems engineering division all had been in engineering roles prior to
their current positions. This included engineering managers, the director, and CLEs. Exceptions
were the buyer personnel who came from logistics backgrounds, bringing their procurement
expertise to the department. Some examples of engineering positions held include: Structural
analysis, materials specifications and databases, software testing and development, hardware
testing and development, systems engineering and controls analysis, service engineering, real
time modeling, program management, and logistics and commodities.
Interviewee core expertise
Engineering Supervisors/Director: Management, process improvement, controls, systems
software, hardware, and systems engineering.
IPT Leads: Program management, problem solving, and electrical engineering.
Controls Lead Engineers: Program management, team lead, systems engineering, coordination,
and representation of the program both internally and externally.
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Buyer/Manager: Aviation purchasing, purchasing for small, large, and complex machine parts
and raw materials (castings, forgings, etc.)
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